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ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF INTER VIVOS
TRANSFERS OF STOCK IN A CLOSELY-
HELD CORPORATION
By ALICE A. SOLED*
For purposes of determining the amount of the federal estate tax,
a decedent's 1 gross estate2 includes not only the value of all trans-
missible property interests beneficially owned by him at the time of
his death,3 but also the value of all property gratuitously transferred
by him during his lifetime, to the extent that such transfers are
considered to be "testamentary dispositions."4 Generally speaking, an
inter vivos transfer is treated by the Internal Revenue Code of 19545
as a "testamentary disposition" if it was made "in contemplation of"
the transferor's death,6 or if the transferee's "possession or enjoyment"
of the property transferred or his interest therein is postponed until
the death of the transferor.' As transfers in contemplation of death
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B.,
1953, J.D., 1955, University of Michigan.
1. For purposes of this article, a "decedent" is a deceased individual who was
a citizen or resident of the United States at the time of his death.
2. The "gross estate" may be defined broadly as the totality of property interests
enumerated, expressly or by implication, in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2033-42.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2031 (a). A decedent's "gross estate" less certain allowable
deductions and exemptions equals his "taxable estate," upon the transfer of which at
his death the federal estate tax is imposed. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2051, 2001.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033; Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1; C. LoWNDES &
R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES §§ 4.1, 4.8, 4.9 (2d ed. 1962).
4. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2035-38. See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§§ 2039, 2040, 2042. N.B. Since a transfer can be a "testamentary disposition," within
the meaning of §§ 2035-38, only if, and to the extent that, it is not a "bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth," the word
"transfer," as used in this article, shall be deemed to refer to a transfer which is not a
"bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,"
except as otherwise expressly indicated. Id. § 2035(a).
5. Hereinafter referred to in the text of this article as "the Code."
6. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
7. Such postponement occurs if (a) the transferor, in connection with the
transfer, retains during his lifetime either (i) "the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property," INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (1), or
(ii) "the right . . . to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom," ITNT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (2), or (iii) "a re-
versionary interest in the property . . . and the value of such reversionary interest
immediately before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of such
property," ITNT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 2037(a) (2), and "possession or enjoyment of
the property can, through ownership of such interest [the interest transferred], be
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are outside the scope of this article, the term "testamentary disposition"
hereafter will be used to refer only to transfers under which "posses-
sion or enjoyment" is postponed.
Ever since Congress introduced the "testamentary disposition"
concept into the federal estate tax law," tax-conscious transferors have
sought unceasingly for the "ideal" inter vivos transfer. The "ideal"
inter vivos transfer is one which is not a testamentary disposition
within the meaning of the Code, even though the transferor retains
during his lifetime, or possesses at his death, sufficient interest in, or
control over, the property transferred that, as a practical matter, the
transferee's possession or enjoyment of the transferred property or
his interest therein must await the transferor's death. Although this
search has not been notably successful in the long run, some of its
fruits presently approximate the ideal. One of these is the inter vivos
transfer of stock in a closely-held corporation, under which the trans-
feror attempts to reserve effective control over the transferred stock,
directly or indirectly, by a means other than a retention of interest in,
or control over, the transferred stock which clearly would render the
transfer a "testamentary disposition." The purpose of this article is
to determine the extent to which the treatment of this device as an
ideal inter vivos transfer is justifiable.
A transfer of stock in a closely-held corporation may be absolute,'
or it may be qualified by the transferor's express or implied' ° retention
of rights, direct or indirect," in or over the transferred stock. A
prospective transferor of such stock who has a desire to retain rights
in or over the transferred stock and an equally strong desire to avoid
the inclusion of the transferred stock in his estate at his death, is
confronted by a dilemma. The greater the degree to which he retains
rights in or over the transferred stock, the greater becomes the risk
that the transfer later will be characterized as a testamentary disposition.
For example, the retention of an income 12 or reversionary 13 interest
obtained only by surviving the decedent," INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037 (a) (1) ; or
(b) the transferor, at the date of his death, can change the enjoyment of the
interest(s) transferred by the exercise of a power to "alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate," INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038 (a) (1).
8. By way of the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777, which
defined the gross estate of a decedent to include the value of all transfers made by
him during his lifetime "in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death." 39 Stat. at 778.
9. In the sense that it is not subject to any express retention of rights there-
under by the transferor.
10. An implied retention of rights under a transfer results from the transferor's
failure to divest himself of such rights under or in connection with the transfer.
Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 654 (1940) ; Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp.
726 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Estate of Harry H. Beckwith,
55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
11. Rights in or over the transferred stock or interests therein are direct if in
or over the transferred stock itself or interests therein, and are indirect if in or over
the corporation as such, so as to be equivalent to rights in or over the transferred
stock itself or interests therein. See Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950);
Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review
dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946).
12. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (1) ; Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1.
13. As defined by INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2037(b), but only if "the value of
such reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent exceeds 5
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in the transferred stock, a general discretionary power 14 "to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate"' 5 the transfer, in whole or in part, or
specific discretionary powers to invade corpus" or to distribute or
accumulate income and add it to corpus 17 clearly would render the
transfer a testamentary disposition within the meaning of the Code.'
Conversely, the greater the degree to which he ensures avoiding a later
characterization of the transfer as a testamentary disposition, the more
completely he must forego the retention for his life of rights in or
over the transferred stock.
The ideal inter vivos transfer of stock in a closely-held corporation
is an attempt to resolve this dilemma, rather than an attempt merely
to avoid one of its horns, at the cost of being impaled on the other.
Such a transfer is understandably alluring because the rights retained,
while they do not clearly render the transfer testamentary, seem to
percent of the value of [the transferred] property," INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037(a) (2), and "possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of
such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent," INT. REV. CODE of 1954,§ 2 0 37(a) (1). N.B. Even if the transferor's retention of a reversionary interest
in the property transferred does not render the transfer a "testamentary disposition"
by virtue of § 2037, the value of the reversionary interest still will be includible in
the transferor's gross estate under § 2033, if such interest survives his death. Treas.
Reg. § 2 0.2 037-1(e), Ex. (1); C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 3, § 4.5.
14. For purposes of this article, a "discretionary power" is a power whose
exercise is not controlled by external standards enforceable by a court having equityjurisdiction.
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038(a) (1) ; INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2036(a) (2),
if the retained power enables the transferor "to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the [transferred] property or the income therefrom."
16. Retention by the transferor of a discretionary power to invade corpus renders
the transfer a "testamentary disposition" under (a) §§ 2036(a) (2) and 2038, (i) if
the power is to be exercised for the benefit of one who is neither an income
beneficiary nor a remainderman under the transfer [3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 24.34, at 564-65 & n.93 (1959) ; W. WARREN
& S. SURREY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 260,
262-63 (1961)], or (ii) if the power is to be exercised for the benefit of the
remainderman, and the income beneficiary and the remainderman are different persons
[C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 3, § 8.19, at 155 (discussing INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2 036(a) (2)) ; see Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) (applying
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038)]; and (b) § 2038 (but probably not § 2036(a) (2)),
if the power is to be exercised for the benefit of the income beneficiary, regardless
of whether the income beneficiary and the remainderman are the same person or are
different persons [Lober v. United States, supra (applying INT. REV. CODE of 1954,§ 2038) ; C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 3, § 8.19, at 155-56 and § 9.13, at 186;
3 J. MERTENS, supra, § 24.33, at 551-52 and § 25.49, at 753-55].
17. Retention by the transferor of a discretionary power to either distribute
or accumulate income and add it to corpus renders the transfer a "testamentary
disposition" under §§ 2036(a) (2) and 2038, regardless of whether the income bene-
ficiary and the remainderman are different persons [Industrial Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164(1949) (by implication), acquiesced in, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3], or the same person[United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) ; Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419(6th Cir. 1968), aff'g and remanding 272 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2038-1 (a). See also the following cases in which the transferor re-
tained both a power to accumulate or distribute income and a power to invade
corpus for the benefit of the income beneficiary: Lober v. United States, 346 U.S.
335 (1953) ; Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Ritter v. United States,
297 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) ; Estate of Russell Harrison Varian, 47 T.C. 34(1966), aff'd, 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).].
18. This article will not discuss, as such, inter vivos transfers of closely-held
corporate stock under which the transferor retains rights whose retention clearly
renders the transfer a "testamentary disposition."
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promise the transferor considerable ability to control until his death
his transferee's complete possession or enjoyment of the transferred
stock. Rights in this category are rights in or over the corporation
whose stock is transferred 9 and certain rights in or over the transferred
stock itself.2 0
19. An inter vivos transfer of closely held corporate stock which is qualified
only by the transferor's implied retention thereunder, and/or possession at his death,
of rights in or over the corporation as such appears not to be a "testamentary
disposition" within the meaning of the Code, irrespective of whether it is outright or
in trust. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6 (managerial powers as president and director of the
corporation were the rights over the corporation impliedly retained by the transferor
under transfers in trust; §§ 2036 (a) (1), (2) held to be inapplicable, on the grounds
that the transferor did not retain voting control of the corporation, and the trans-
ferees were absolutely free to dispose of the transferred stock, the managerial powers
of the transferor not being referred to) ; Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869(1949), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951) (noncontrolling beneficial
interest in other stock of the corporation, and managerial powers as officer of the
corporation, were the rights over the corporation impliedly retained by the trans-
feror under transfers both outright and in trust; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, §§
811(c), (d), 53 Stat. 120 [hereinafter cited in footnotes as Int. Rev. Code of 1939
and in text as the 1939 Code] (reenacted without substantial change as INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (2), 2037, 2038), held to be inapplicable) ; Estate of Alexander
K. Sessoms, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1056 (1949) (managerial power as president
of the corporation was the right over the corporation impliedly retained by the
transferor under transfer in trust; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(c), (d) (re-
enacted without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2037, 2038), and
the "Clifford doctrine" which would have required inclusion of the transferred
property in the gross estate under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(a) (reenacted
without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033), held to be inapplicable) ;
Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review
dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18; 1946) (beneficial ownership of an option to acquire a
controlling voting stock interest in the corporation, and of indebtedness of the
corporation, were the rights over the corporation impliedly retained by the transferor
under outright transfers; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(c), (d) (reenacted without
substantial change as INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 2036(a)(1), (2), 2037, 2038),
held to be inapplicable, the court implying that the result would have been the
same had the transferor in fact owned the controlling voting stock interest in the
corporation after the transfer). Cf., e.g., Estate of Maxcy v. Commissioner, 71-1
U.S. Tax Cas. f 12,765 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 1971), rev'g 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 783(1969) (beneficial ownership of other stock in the corporation, and corporate
managerial powers as an officer and director of the corporation, were the rights over
the corporation impliedly retained by the transferor under an outright transfer;
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2033, held inapplicable); Rosen v. Commissioner, 397
F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 834 (1967), nonacquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 69-344,
1969-1 CuM. BULL. 225 (beneficial ownership of controlling voting stock interest in
the corporation and managerial powers as directors of the corporation were the
rights over the corporation impliedly retained by the transferors; transfers in trust
of the closely-held corporate stock were held to be completed gifts of both the income
and principal interests therein, and the transferors were held to be entitled to use of
the "annual per donee exclusion" under § 2503(b) in computing the taxable value of
the gifts of the income interests, despite the fact that the corporation never had paid
dividends); Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952), aff'd on this
point and vacated and remanded on other grounds, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953)(property transferred outright to closely-held non-stock membership corporation by
one who was incorporator, member and director of corporation; membership in
corporation and managerial powers as director were the rights over the corporation
impliedly retained by the transferor; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(c), (d) (re-
enacted without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (1), (a) (2),
2038), held inapplicable). But cf. Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl.
1969) (group life insurance policy irrevocably assigned by one who was an officer,
and who owned fifty percent of the voting stock of the corporation to which the
master group life insurance policy was issued; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(2),
held to be inapplicable, although the court implied that § 2042(2) would apply, on
the theory that the transferor retained "incidents of ownership" in the assigned
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Rights retained in or over the corporation as such consist of bene-
ficial ownership of other of its stock, its corporate indebtedness or
an option to acquire other stock. They also may consist of managerial
powers over the corporation by reason of the transferor's position as
an officer or director. However, only if the holder of one or more of
these rights is thereby in a position to control the value of the transferred
stock or the amount of dividends paid thereon are such retained rights
equivalent to rights in or over the transferred stock itself.21 Conse-
quently, only a transferor who, after the transfer of some of his stock,
has a controlling22 voting stock interest in the corporation possesses
policy, "if the corporation is wholly-owned or if it is proved that a particular
stockholder has control over a sufficient number of other stockholders to effectuate
a cancellation [of the master policy] at his will." 408 F.2d at 471.) ; Elise McK.
Morgan, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966), acquiesced in, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 6, holding that
the owners of a controlling voting stock interest in a closely-held corporation were
not entitled to an income tax deduction or a gift tax deduction or exclusion for
transfers in trust of non-voting stock in the corporation, a twenty-year income
interest in the trust being payable to charity, since the donors could at any time deny
the income to the charity by refraining from declaring dividends; Rev. Rul. 71-463,
1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 42, at 25, holding that life insurance proceeds paid to a
closely-held corporation upon the death of its president-controlling stockholder are
includible in the decedent's gross estate under § 2042(2), since the decedent possessed
"incidents of ownership" in the policy by virtue of his control, as majority stock-
holder, over its economic benefits. The Ruling cited Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2),
approved in Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). An inter
vivas transfer of closely-held corporate stock which is qualified only by the trans-
feror's express retention thereunder, and/or possession at his death, of rights in
or over the corporation as such, likewise appears not to be a "testamentary disposition"
within the meaning of the Code. Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mene.
769 (1951). Cf. Estate of Meyer Goldberg, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1951).
20. See notes 188-261 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950); Estate
of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.1951); Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for
review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946). Cf. Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461(Ct. Cl. 1969); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Reeves' Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
813 (1950). See also Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 769(1951). But see Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971), holding, inter alia, that voting control of a
corporation is not equivalent to a right in or over the transferred stock itself or
interests therein; Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952), aff'd
on this point and vacated and remanded on other grounds, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir.
1953), and Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945),
acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 Cum. BULL. 4, 8, implying that corporate
managerial powers cannot in any event be equivalent to a right in or over the
transferred stock itself or interests therein. Rights in or over the corporation which
are equivalent to rights in or over the transferred stock itself are indirect rights in
or over the transferred stock. Note 11 supra.
22. For purposes of this article, the terms "voting control" and "controlling
voting stock interest" mean the right to vote more than fifty percent of the voting
stock of the corporation. The estate tax consequences of effective voting control,
through the right to vote fifty percent or less of the corporate voting stock, is not
considered here. While effective voting control, as distinguished from legal voting
control, might not be deemed a § 2036(a) (2) or § 2038 power in any event [see
Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Rev. Rul. 71-463, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 42, at 25], it should be deemed such a power. There is little
real difference, for tax purposes, between legal voting control and effective voting
control. N.B. There is no attribution doctrine in the estate tax area.
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rights equivalent to rights in or over the transferred stock itself.2 3
This is so because, as a practical matter, only he is in a position
ultimately to direct corporate policy affecting the value of the transferred
stock and the dividends paid thereon.
More obvious in its effects, yet not clearly testamentary, is the
retention of certain rights in or over the transferred stock itself. These
rights consist of powers, exercisable in either a fiduciary or nonfiduciary
capacity, to vote the transferred stock or to control its disposition.24
They may also consist of administrative powers over the transferred
stock, exercisable only in a fiduciary capacity, including but not limited
to the power to allocate receipts between income and corpus.25
While the control over the transferred stock afforded the transferor
by his retention of one or more of the above rights can be considerable,
the courts have been hesitant to characterize a transfer involving the
retention of such rights as a testamentary disposition. 6 This judicial
reluctance has been based on one or more of the following theories:
(1) an implied retention of rights in or over the corporation as such
is not a retention under the transfer of rights in or over the transferred
stock within the meaning of section 2036 or section 2037 of the Code
or their progenitors ;27 (2) rights in or over the corporation as such
are not in any event within any of the classes of rights in or over the
transferred stock itself described in sections 2036-38 of the Code and
their progenitors,28 or alternatively, cannot come within any of such
classes of rights unless, at the very least, the transferred stock is
unmarketable or its disposition is subject to control by the transferor ;29
(3) the exercise of the powers afforded the transferor by his retention
23. See Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950); Estate
of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.
1951) ; Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for
review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946) ; Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 269.
Cf. Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'g in part and vacating and
remanding in part 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952) ; Reeves' Estate v. Commissioner,
180 F. 2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950) ; Yeazel v. Coyle,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968) ; Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
24. Discussed infra pp. 221-34.
25. Id.
26. Cases cited in note 19 supra; notes 106-261 infra and accompanying text.
27. Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for
review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946). Cf. Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F. Supp. 610
(D. Mass. 1952), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 204 F.2d 855
(1st Cir. 1953).
28. Estate .of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for
review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946). See Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971). Cf. Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952),
aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953);
Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced
in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 Cum. BULL. 4, 8.
29. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6. See Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524
(N.D. III. 1968) ; Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 269. Cf. Rosen v. Commissioner,
397 F.2d 245(4th Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 834 (1967), non-acquiesced in, Rev. Rul.
69-344, 1969-4 Cum. BULL. 225; Richard P. Makoff, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 83
(1967) ; Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950). See also Estate of William L.
Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 769 (1951).
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of rights in or over the corporation or in or over the transferred
stock itself is controlled by external standards enforceable by a court
of equity and, therefore, is nondiscretionary in the hands of the trans-
feror." The discussion to follow will treat these issues by analyzing the
cases in which they have arisen, examining closely the authoritative
value of their conclusions and the merit of their reasoning.
I. RETENTION UNDER THE TRANSFER
In Estate of George H. Burr,31 the only case which actually
decided this point, the Tax Court held that the transferor's implied
retention of rights in or over the corporation as such was not a
retention under the transfer of rights in or over the transferred stock
within the meaning of a predecessor of section 2036 of the Code,"
for the reason that "[s]uch potential powers as the decedent had to
obtain stock control of Monide, Ltd., were acquired in a transaction
with the corporation [an option granted to him prior to his making
the transfers in question] and, accordingly, were not reserved by him
in the transfers in question.""3 Similarly, in Gardner v. Delaney,4 the
federal district court held that a person who transferred property to a
closely-held non-stock membership corporation, of which she then was
a member and director, did not retain under the transfer any rights in
or over the transferred property, since "[a]ny indirect interest [in such
property] she may thereafter have had, arose not from the transfer
but solely from her membership in a previously existing corporation
and from the charter and by-laws defining the rights of such members."3 5
These decisions, however, are not in accord with the now prevailing
view that section 2036 of the Code "applies not only where the reserva-
tion of rights or control over the property is expressed in the instrument
of transfer but also where the right is retained in connection with, or
as an incident to, the transfer,"3 6 or its corollary, that a transferor
retains a right under a transfer if he does not thereby surrender such
right. 37 Consequently, assuming that rights in or over the corporation
30. See notes 134-261 infra and accompanying text.
31. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054, petition for review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18,
1946).
32. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c).
33. Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054, 1064 (1945), petition
for review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946).
34. 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded
in part, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953).
35. 103 F. Supp. at 616.
36. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242, CCH 1970 TAX CT. REP. (55
T.C.) Dec. No. 30,401, at 3462 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. Rv. BULL No. 9,
at 6, citing Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959).
37. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949) ; Helvering
v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 654 (1940) (the court stating, "we think the words 'retained the right
to the income' [as used in the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27 § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70[hereinafter cited as Revenue Act of 1926] (as amended, INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2036)] are used in the context to mean the opposite of 'surrender the right to
the income,'" 111 F.2d at 226) ; Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726(E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963) (the court stating, "[slection
811(c) (1) (B) (i) [of Int. Rev. Code of 1939 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
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as such are held to be within a class of rights in or over the transferred
stock itself described in sections 2036-38, their implied retention
undoubtedly will be held to be a retention under the transfer of indirect
rights in or over the transferred stock within the meaning of at least
section 2036 of the Code."
II. RETENTION OF VOTING CONTROL OF THE CORPORATION:
A RETENTION OF RIGHTS IN OR OVER THE TRANSFERRED
STOCK WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTIONS 2036-38
The question of whether rights in or over the corporation as
such should be classified as rights in or over the transferred stock itself,
such as would bring the transfer within the scope of any one or more
of sections 2036-38 of the Code, is not as easy to resolve. The answer
in part depends on whether the holder of rights in or over the
corporation has voting control of the corporation. As previously in-
dicated,"9 only rights in or over the corporation as such which arise
from the retention of a controlling voting stock interest are important
to this discussion, for only they are indirect rights in or over the
transferred stock.4" Other rights in or over the corporation are not
in any sense rights in or over the transferred stock itself, because they
do not enable their holders ultimately to control the value of the trans-
ferred stock or dividends paid thereon. 41 Consequently, they cannot
be considered rights in or over the transferred stock within the meaning
of sections 2036-38.42 Of course, it could be argued that retention of
2036(a)(1))] says that enjoyment must be 'retained' by the settlor. The word
'retained' implies that the settlor has not given something away at the time he
signed the trust agreement," 197 F. Supp. at 729); Estate of Harry H. Beckwith,
55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6. Cf. Estate of
McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829(1959), distinguishing on its facts Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946) ; Reeves' Estate
v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950), cert denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950).
38. See Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 269.
39. Cases cited in notes 21 & 23 supra and text accompanying notes 21-23.
40. Note 11 supra.
41. See cases cited in notes 21 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
42. See Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ; Yeazel
v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ir 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968) ; Estate of Harry H. Beckwith,
55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of
George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed(2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946). Cf. Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) ; Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner,
436 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1971), rev'g 52 T.C. 830 (1969), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) ; State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (Ist Cir.
1959) ; Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'g in part and vacating
and remanding in part 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952); Estate of Edward E.
Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f" 12,813 (2d Cir.
Nov. 12, 1971); Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 590(1st Cir. 1964); Estate of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946), aff'd on this point
and rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947). N.B. Although four cases, from their facts, can be said
to hold that a transferor's implied retention of rights in or over a closely-held corpora-
tion as such does not, of itself, require his transfer of stock therein to be characterized
as a "testamentary disposition," one of them, Estate of George H. Burr, supra,
involved an implied retention of indirect rights in or over the transferred stock or
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a controlling voting stock interest in the corporation is not essential
to application of section 2036(a) (2) or section 2038. A literal inter-
pretation of these sections would encompass rights in or over the
corporation held by one who does not have voting control of the
corporation since these sections apply to rights over the transferred
property which are exercisable "only in conjunction with another person
or persons, whether or not having an adverse interest.""* Although such
a view would be consistent with the letter of the statute," assuming that
indirect rights over the transferred stock are deemed to be within the
scope of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038, the courts probably will not so
hold, at least in the foreseeable future. Such a holding, it would be
argued, would not be consistent with the spirit of the statute, since "[i]f
the Government's argument were carried to its logical conclusion, the
donor of the stock in a closely-held corporation would be required to
divorce himself of all remaining interest in the corporation in order to
make his gift effective for tax purposes. The sweep of section 203 6 (a)
is not that broad. '45
interests therein. The others, Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, mpra; Estate of
C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.
1951); and Estate of Alexander K. Sessoms, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1056 (1949),
while involving an implied retention of rights in or over the corporation as such
which were not indirect rights in or over the transferred stock or interests therein[see note 19 supra], either gave no reason for expressly holding that such retention
does not, of itself, require the transfer to be characterized as a "testamentary dis-
position" [Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, supra], or so held by implication [Estate of
Harry H. Beckwith and Estate of Alexander K. Sessoms, supra].
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3) (i), 20.2038-1 (a) (ii) (interpreting INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (2), 2038, respectively).
44. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2036(a), which provides, in part, "The value of
the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer . . . under which he
has retained . . . (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom" (emphasis added), and § 2038(a), which provides, in part, "[tihe value
of the gross estate shall include the value of all property - (1) . . . [t]o the extent
of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer . . .
where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power . . . by the decedent alone or by the decedent
in conjunction with any other person . . . to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate
.... " (emphasis added). See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S.
85 (1935), holding that the phrase "in conjunction with any person," as used in
the Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(d) (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038), includes
a person or persons having a substantial adverse interest in the exercise of the
power, as well as a person or persons having no such interest.
45. Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524, at 87,387 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
Accord, Byrum v. United States. 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971). Cf. Landorf v.
United States, 408 F.2d 416 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Contra, Howard v. United States,
125 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1942) : "We have been cited to no authority, and we are
aware of none, to the effect that the Revenue Act has no application to property
otherwise subject to the tax because the taxpayer is powerless to deal therewith
in a manner that will place it beyond the coverage of the Act." It also may be
argued that the power of a holder of rights in or over a corporation as such to
control the value of stock therein transferred by him, and the amount, if any,
of dividends paid thereon, if, but only if, he acts in concert with other holders of
such rights, is merely a power conferred upon him by state law, and therefore
cannot be the basis of inclusion of the value of the transferred stock, or interests
therein, in the transferor's gross estate, at least insofar as § 2038 is concerned.
Cf. Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952), aff'd on this point and
vacated and remanded in part, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953), citing Helvering v.
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Of the few cases46 which can be said to hold that a transferor's
implied retention of rights in or over a corporation as such does not
require his transfer of stock to be characterized as a testamentary
disposition, Estate of George H. Burr47 is the only one in which the
rights retained included voting control and thus were in fact indirect
rights in or over the transferred stock.48 In Burr, the decedent caused
the formation of a Canadian corporation with an authorized capital of
20,000 shares of Class A voting stock, none of which ever was 'issued,
and of 70,000 shares of Class B voting stock. Almost immediately
thereafter he obtained, in exchange for property transferred to the
corporation, corporate promissory notes in a principal amount in excess
of $2,000,000 and the issuance to his nominee of approximately 9,000
shares of the Class B voting stock. On the same day, 400 shares of
the Class B voting stock were issued to his secretary, and an option
to purchase the remaining authorized but unissued 60,600 shares of
Class B voting stock was granted him by the corporation. Five months
later, he made outright gratuitous transfers to members of his family,
friends, and charitable organizations of all of the shares of Class B
voting stock previously issued to his nominee. A little over a year
later he exercised his option in part, purchasing another 1,100 shares
of the Class B voting stock, all of which he promptly transferred by
gift to members of his family and friends (300 shares outright and
800 shares to two trusts in which he had no interest, over which he
had no power, and of which he was not a fiduciary). He died eight
months later, still owning corporate promissory notes in the face
amount of $830,000 and possessing the power to acquire a controlling
voting stock interest in the corporation by virtue of his option to
Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93 (1935), and Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.20 (now Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2038-1(a)(2)). This argument, however, should not, and in all probability
will not, be accepted. See Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942),
which held that the value of an inter vivos gift by one spouse to the other was
includible in the transferor's gross estate under § 302(d)(1) of the Revenue Act
of 1926 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038), on the theory that the transfer
was a revocable one within the meaning of this statute, even though the transfer
was revocable solely by virtue of a Louisiana statute which provided that all gifts
made between husband and wife during the marriage always shall be revocable by
the donor, distinguishing Helvering v. Helmholz, supra, on the ground that the
power involved in the Helmholz case not only was vested in the transferor by state
law, but also was exercisable by him only in conjunction with all persons having
an interest in the transferred property. Accord, Vaccaro v. United States, 149 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1945).
46. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd
per curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951), Estate of Alexander K. Sessoms, 8 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1056 (1949) ; Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054
(1945), petition for review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946).
47. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed (2d Cir.
Dec. 18, 1946).
48. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per
curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951) ; and Estate of Alexander K. Sessoms, 8 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1056 (1949) in fact involved only an implied retention of rights in
or over the corporation as such which were not indirect rights in or over the
transferred stock or interests therein [see notes 19 & 42 supra], although Estate of
Harry H. Beckwith, supra, discussed the implied retention of indirect rights in or
over the transferred stock or interest therein.
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purchase the remaining 59,500 authorized but unissued shares of the
Class B voting stock. A deficiency in estate tax was determined on
the ground, inter alia, that the value of all of the Class B voting stock
transferred by decedent to his family and friends was includible in
his gross estate. The Government's contention was that, by reason
of his retention of ownership of indebtedness of the corporation and
of an option to purchase a controlling voting stock interest therein,
the transfers were "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death" ;49 the transferred stock was subject to the decedent's
retained " 'right, either alone or in conjunction with any person to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income' ";50 and the enjoyment of the transferred stock " 'was subject
at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power
. . . to alter, amend, revoke or terminate.' "" As noted earlier, the
Tax Court held that no part of the value of the transferred stock was
includible in the decedent's gross estate, on the theory that the retention
was not "under the transfer.""2 The court, however, did not rely on
this theory alone. It also apparently based its decision on the theory
that rights in or over the corporation as such are not in any event
within any of the classes of rights in or over the transferred stock
described in sections 811(c) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939." a On this point the court stated:
Obviously, such power [voting stock control of the corporation]
would not entail revocation of the transfers. We do not think
such power otherwise fills the requirements of the language of
section 8 11(c) and (d), or warrants inclusion in the estate of
the entire stock interest transferred, as here urged. The same
is true of the power through ownership of notes. The language
of the controlling section should not be extended so far. Petitioner's
economic interest in the stock passed beyond recall when the
transfers were made and, consequently, there was nothing to pass
at the time of, or after, his death.54
Insofar as Burr holds that a transferor's implied retention of indirect
rights in or over the transferred stock does not, of itself, cause the trans-
fer to be either one which is "intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death"5 5 or one "under which he has retained
49. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1062, paraphrasing that portion of Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 811 (c), which evolved into INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037.
50. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1062, quoting, albeit slightly inaccurately, that
portion of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c), which thereafter was reenacted without
substantial change as INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036 (a) (2).
51. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1062, quoting Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(d) (1)
(now INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2038(a) (1)).
52. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
53. Now INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 2036-38.
54. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1064.
55. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c) (quoted portion evolved into INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2037).
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. . . the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property" transferred,56 it clearly is correct.
It seems to be well settled that a transfer is not "intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after [the transferor's]
death," within the meaning of section 811 (c) of the 1939 Code and
its predecessors, unless the transferor retains thereunder a beneficial
interest in, or a beneficial power over, the transferred property which
passes from him at his death. 7 By definition, however, indirect rights
in or over the transferred stock fall in neither category.5 8  Since the
transferor's possession of indirect rights in or over the transferred
stock, of itself, enables him only to control the value of the transferred
stock and dividends paid thereon, 9 it does not give him any property
interest in the transferred stock, nor does it enable him to use the
transferred stock for his own benefit. As was stated by the Tax Court
in Burr, "[p]etitioner's economic interest in the stock passed beyond
recall when the transfers were made and, consequently, there was
nothing to pass at the time of, or after, his death."6 Consequently,
a transferor's retention of indirect rights in or over the transferred
stock cannot, of itself, render the transfer one which is "intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death."'"
56. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (c) (quoted portion subsequently reenacted
without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (1)). The Com-
missioner apparently did not assert, in the Burr case that the decedent, by re-
taining indirect rights in or over the stock transferred by him, to wit, corporate
indebtedness and the power to obtain voting stock control of the corporation, "re-
tained . . . the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
[transferred] property," [Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c) (quoted portion re-
enacted without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a)(1))].
It is not clear from the decision therein whether the Tax Court undertook to hold
expressly that the decedent retained no such rights. However, the Tax Court did
state that "[elven if the option had been exercised to the extent of obtaining stock
control of the corporation, the powers thus acquired would not have . . . given him
any right, alone or in conjunction with another, to possess the property transferred,
i.e., the stock, or enjoy the income therefrom." 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1064.
In support of its decision, moreover, the Tax Court cited Estate of William F.
Hofford, 4 T.C. 542, modified, 4 T.C. 790 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in,
1945 CuM. BULL. 4, 8, which involved solely the question of whether the decedent
therein "retained . . . the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property" transferred by him, within the meaning of Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 811 (c).
57. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
58. Note 11 supra and cases cited therein; text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
See Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 949
(6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel v. Coyle,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Estate of Harry H. Beckwith,
55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of
George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed
(2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946).
59. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel v.
Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Estate of George H. Burr,
4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18,
1946). See Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in,
1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
60. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1064.
61. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Estate of George
H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed (2d Cir.
Dec. 18, 1946).
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This conclusion, moreover, is not affected by changes in the
above statutory language made in the course of its evolution into the
present section 2037 of the Code. Like its predecessors, section 2037
requires, as a condition precedent to its applicability, that the transferor
retain a "reversionary interest" in the property transferred.6 ' The
term reversionary interest is defined by section 2037 to include "a
possibility that property transferred by the decedent - (1) may
return to him or his estate, or (2) may be subject to a power of
disposition by him," 3 and such power of disposition need not be
beneficial in order to be a reversionary interest. 4 The statute further
provides, however, that "such term [reversionary interest] does not
include a possibility that the income alone from such property may
return to him or become subject to a power of disposition by him."6
Since indirect rights in or over the transferred stock are neither bene-
ficial interests therein nor beneficial powers thereover,"6 they can be
reversionary interests for purposes of section 2037(a) (2) only if they
are considered to be nonbeneficial powers of disposition within the
meaning of section 2037(b)(2) of the Code. Such indirect rights,
however, consist at most of only the powers to control the value of the
transferred stock and the dividends paid thereon. 7 The power to
control the amount of dividends paid on the transferred stock, since
it is equivalent to a power to accumulate or defer the income from the
transferred property, 68 is a power of disposition over the income alone
from such property." Therefore, by the express language of the
statute, 0 it is not a section 2037(b) reversionary interest. Arguably,
however, retained voting control gives some power to control the
value of the transferred stock itself, for example, by controlling business
and investment policies. This power to affect the value of the trans-
ferred stock would appear not to be a section 2037(b) (2) power of
disposition, either on the theory that it is analogous to a power in
the grantor of a trust to direct the investment policy of the trustee,
which generally has been held not to be a power to alter, amend, revoke,
or terminate within the meaning of section 2038 of the Code,7' or
on the theory that, even if it is analogous to a power in the grantor
of a trust to make substitutions for the securities constituting its corpus,
62. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037(a) (2).
63. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2037(b).
64. C. LOWNDES AND R. KRAMFR, supra note 3, § 7.5, at 108-09; 3 J. MERTENS,
supra note 16, § 23.32, at 419-20.
65. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037(b).
66. See note 11 supra and cases cited therein; text accompanying notes 21-23
supra; cases cited note 59 supra and accompanying text.
67. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra; cases cited note 59 supra and
accompanying text.
68. Cases cited notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text.
69. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947) and
cases cited therein; 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 16, § 25.48.
70. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037(b), quoted in text accompanying note 65
supra.
71. E.g., Estate of George W. Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946), acquiesced in, 1946-2Cum. BULL. 3; Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943), petition for review
dismissed nolle pros. (2d Cir. June 1, 1944), nonacquiesced in, 1944 CuM. BULL. 37.
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which is a section 2038 power if purely discretionary,72 it is removed
from the scope of section 2037(b) (2) by the fact that it is held by
the transferor in a fiduciary capacity."5
Likewise, it appears to be firmly established that a transferor will
be deemed to have retained "the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property" transferred, within the meaning
of section 2 036(a) (1) of the Code and its predecessors,74 only if he
has retained a "substantial present economic benefit ' 75 from the property
transferred, that is, the beneficial use thereof,76 either in law or in fact.717
A transferor's possession of indirect rights in or over the transferred
stock of itself, however, gives him no property interest in the transferred
stock, nor does it enable him to use the transferred stock for his own
benefit. 7' As the Tax Court said in Burr, "[e]ven if the option had
been exercised to the extent of obtaining stock control of the corpora-
tion, the powers thus acquired would not have . . . given him [the
decedent-transferor] any right, alone or in conjunction with another,
to possess the property transferred, i.e., the stock, or enjoy the income
therefrom .... Petitioner's economic interest in the stock passed beyond
recall when the transfers were made . . . . 7 Thus, a retention of
indirect rights in or over the transferred stock is not, in and of itself,
a retention of "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property" transferred, within the meaning of section
2 036(a) (1) of the Code. 0
72. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Pa. 1943),
aff'd, 137 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1943), cert denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944).
73. See 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 16, § 23.33, at 427. Cf. Byrum v. United
States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ;
Fifth Avenue Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) ; Estate of Willard
v. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 5.
74. Including Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c).
75. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959), the court stating, in 265 F.2d at 671, that "[e]njoyment
as used in the death tax statute is not a word of art but is synonymous with sub-
stantial present economic benefit"; Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892, 894(S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted. 40 U.S.L.W. 3219(U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ; Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18,
1968). See Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2
CUM. BULL. 3; Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945),
acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL. 4, 8.
76. See cases cited note 75 supra and Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (2).
77. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959) ; Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726(E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
78. See note 11 supra and cases cited therein; text accompanying notes 21-23
supra; cases cited note 59 supra and accompanying text.
79. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1064.
80. This conclusion is not determinative of the question [discussed in the text
accompanying notes 188-209 infra] whether a transferor's retention of the right to
vote the transferred stock is a retention of "the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property" transferred, within the meaning of §2 036(a) (1) of the Code. For, while a transferor's possession of indirect rights in
or over the transferred stock presupposes his possession of a controlling voting stock
interest in the corporation [cases cited notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text],
such voting control, by definition, is not in any event dependent upon a power in
him to vote the transferred stock, since such power would be a direct right thereover[note 11 supra and cases cited therein], and does not, in fact, involve a power in him
to vote the transferred stock, when he possesses only indirect rights in or over such
stock [note 11 supra and cases cited therein].
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On the other hand, to the extent that Burr holds that a transferor's
implied retention of indirect rights in or over the transferred stock
does not of itself under any circumstances cause the transfer to be one
"under which he has retained . . . the right, either alone or in con-
junction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom,' ' s8 or cause the enjoy-
ment of any interest transferred to be "subject at the date of his death
to any change through the exercise of a power . . . by the decedent
alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person . . . to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,18 2 it would seem to be incorrect. The
power to control the amount of dividends paid on the transferred stock,
which is inherent in the transferor's possession of indirect rights in
or over such stock," involves the power to defer the payment of income
therefrom. 4 It therefore is tantamount to a power to accumulate or
distribute the income from the transferred property, 5 which, if dis-
cretionary, is "the right . . . to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the [transferred] property or the income therefrom,"
within the meaning of section 2036(a) (2) of the Code, 6 if retained by
the transferor under the transfer. Furthermore, it is a power to
alter or amend the enjoyment of the income interest in the trans-
81. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c) (quoted portion subsequently reenacted
without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2036 (a) (2)).
82. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(d) (1) (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
2038 (a) (1)).
83. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
84. Reeves' Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 813 (1950) ; Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970),
aff'd, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ;
Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968) ; Estate of Harry
H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6;
Elise McK. Morgan, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966), acquiesced in, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 6; Rev.
Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 269. See Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
As the court stated in Yeazel, supra at 87,387, "by reason of retaining the voting
rights, Mrs. Crowley remained in the position of controlling the dividend policy
of the corporation and the distribution of income to the beneficiaries. . . . Mrs.
Crowley could have prevented the corporation from paying a dividend .... ." And,
according to Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 269, 270, "[wlhere a decedent trans-
fers nonvoting stock in trust and holds for the remainder of his life voting stock giving
him control over the dividend policy of the corporation, he has retained, for a period
which did not in fact end before his death, the right to determine the income from
the nonvoting stock." N.B. A transferor's possession of indirect rights in or over the
transferred stock presupposes his possession of a controlling voting stock interest in
the corporation. Cases cited notes 21 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
85. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Joy v. United States,
404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g and remanding 272 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Mich.
1967). See Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) ; Struthers v. Kelm, 218
F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Ritter v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.W. Va.
1968); Estate of Russell Harrison Varian, 47 T.C. 34 (1966), aff'd, 396 F.2d 753
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968). Contra, 3 J. MERTENS, supra
note 16, § 24.28, at 534-36 & n.32 (1959 & Supp. 1969), and § 25.37, at 707-08 & n.28
(1959 & Supp. 1969).
86. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Joy v. United States,
404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1966), aff'g and remanding 272 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Mich.
1967) ; Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Ritter
v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) ; Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey,
12 T.C. 1164 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3. See Struthers v. Kelm,
218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Estate of Russell Harrison Varian, 47 T.C. 34
(1966), aff'd, 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
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ferred property within the meaning of section 2038, if exercisable
by the transferor at the date of his death.87 Consequently, a trans-
feror's possession of indirect rights in or over the transferred stock
should, at least under some circumstances, cause the inclusion of
the entire value of the transferred stock"8 or, alternatively, only the
value of the income interest in the transferred stock, in his gross estate
under section 2 036(a) (2) or section 2038(a) (1) of the Code, re-
spectively. 9 This conclusion, moreover, is not affected by those cases
which can be said to hold that the powers possessed by a transferor
over the transferred stock solely by virtue of his retention of voting
control of the corporation do not render the transfer subject to section
2036(a) (2)9' or section 2038(a) (1) 91 since, in view of the bases of
decision therein, none of these cases should be deemed conclusive on
either of these issues.
Burr, which was the first of these cases to be decided, did not
even discuss the proposition that a transferor's retention of voting
control of the corporation enables him to defer the payment of income
from the transferred stock, and therefore brings the transfer within
the scope of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038(a) (1) of the Code. In
fact, the Commissioner did not even argue it. Although the Com-
missioner "contended that through the decedent's ownership of notes
of Monide, Ltd., he could control the payment of dividends, and thus
retained the right to designate the persons who could possess or enjoy
the stock transferred and the power to 'alter, amend, revoke or ter-
minate,' "92 his contention with respect to the decedent's option to
purchase a controlling voting stock interest in the corporation was only
that the decedent thereby
could obtain complete control over the corporation and by exercis-
ing such control completely destroy, or greatly diminish, the equity
in the 8844 shares in controversy here by causing the corporation
to pay his notes in full and prevent the other stockholders from
selling their stock without his consent. . . . [and thus had] the
power "to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
87. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Estate
of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CuM. BULL. 3.
See Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) ; Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419(6th Cir. 1968), aff'g and remanding 272 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Mich. 1967) ; Struthers
v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Estate of Russell Harrison Varian, 47 T.C. 34(1966), aff'd, 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
88. See Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 269.
89. § 2036(a) (2) of the Code normally would be utilized to the exclusion of§ 2038(a) (1), if both are applicable to a particular transfer, since application of§ 2036(a) (2) normally will result in the inclusion of a larger amount in the
transferor's gross estate.
90. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp.
892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ; Yeazel
v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Estate of George H. Burr,
4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18,
1946).
91. Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945), petition for
review dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 1946).
92. Id. at 1062.
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property or the income therefrom," and to change the enjoyment,
which constitutes a power "to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate."'
Moreover, the Tax Court, in its decision, dealt only with the express
contentions of the Commissioner, and then only in a compartmentalized
manner.
More specifically, in holding that the decedent's retention of
indebtedness of the corporation did not, of itself, render the transfers
subject to either section 811(c) 4 or section 811(d)95 of the 1939
Code, the Tax Court stated,
[s]uch powers in the donor were no more than the rights possessed
by any creditor of a corporation and did not affect the finality of
the gifts or the title the donees had in the stock, or deprive the
donees of their rights, as stockholders, to dividends, when earnings
were available and dividends were declared. The stock was re-
ceived, subject to the charge of the notes as a liability of the cor-
poration and any rights decedent saw fit to waive as a holder of
the notes, instead of depriving the stockholders of any enjoyment,
etc., operated to give the corporation extra income to pass on to
them by way of dividends, and gave the stockholders additional
rather than less enjoyment of the stock."
It is clear from this language that the court addressed itself here only
to the Commissioner's argument that the decedent's retention of the
corporation's indebtedness enabled him to control the payment of
dividends.97 In so doing, it ignored decedent's power to obtain a con-
trolling voting stock interest in the corporation. Consequently, neither
the court's holding on this point, nor the above-quoted reasoning on
which it was based, is authority for the proposition that a transferor's
retention of voting control of a corporation does not bring his trans-
fers of its stock within the scope of section 2036(a) (2) or section
2038 of the Code. Rather, it is authority only for the proposition that
ownership of indebtedness of a corporation by a transferor of stock
therein does not, of itself, render the transfer subject to either section
2036(a) (2) or section 2038, since it enables the transferor to affect
the enjoyment of the transferred stock only beneficially, to wit, by
cancelling part or all of the indebtedness, thereby possibly increasing
the corporate surplus available for distribution as dividends.9"
93. Id. at 1063.
94. Relevant portion reenacted without substantial change as INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 2036(a) (2).
95. Now INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2038.
96. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1062-63.
97. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
98. This proposition appears to be correct. Corporate dividends generally are
payable only out of earnings or surplus. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CoRPORA-
TIONS §§ 235, 239, 243-50 (rev. ed. 1946). Surplus "is the excess of the assets over
the liabilities and capital stock of an enterprise." G. MAcFARLAND & R. AYARs,
ACCOUNTING FUNDAMENTALS 334 (1st ed. 1936). See H. BALLANTINE, supra, §§ 223,
224, 22 7a. Thus, enforcement of the payment of corporate indebtedness by theholder thereof cannot adversely affect the amount of corporate surplus technically
available for the payment of dividends. Such surplus will be the same as it would have
been had he not enforced such payment, since any decrease in the amount of cor-
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Likewise, when the court did in fact consider decedent's power
to obtain voting control of the corporation, and held that such power
did not, of itself, bring the transfers within the scope of either section
811(c) 99 or section 811(d)' °  of the 1939 Code, it limited itself
to a discussion solely of the Commissioner's contention that such
power in the decedent rendered sections 811(c) and (d) of the 1939
Code applicable to the transfers because it enabled him to diminish, or
even destroy, the value of the transferred stock.' 01 This is clear from
the court's reasoning in support of its holding on this issue:
[e]ven if the option had been exercised to the extent of obtaining
stock control of the corporation, the powers thus acquired would
not have enabled the decedent to recall or modify in any way the
terms of the transfers .... Moreover, it is clear that any exercise
of a power, through exercise of the option, to secure approxi-
mately six-sevenths of the corporate stock . . . and so to . . .
control the corporation, would be at most an indirect control
over the stock, and would be only partial, merely affecting value.
The transferees of the stock, as such, would remain owners, and
entitled to at least a substantial interest in the stock. Obviously,
such power would not entail revocation of the transfers. 2
Since such reasoning fails to take account of the fact that voting
control of a corporation enables its holder to defer the payment of
income from the stock,0 3 it follows that the court's holding on this
point cannot be regarded as conclusive. This is particularly true in
light of the subsequent evolution of the doctrine that a discretionary
power to accumulate or distribute income is both a right to designate
porate assets, due to their use to satisfy the indebtedness, is balanced by a corre-
sponding decrease in the amount of such indebtedness. Moreover, although the
holder of corporate indebtedness, by cancelling it gratuitously, possibly can beneficially
affect the amount of corporate surplus technically available for the payment of
dividends, since the resulting decrease in corporate indebtedness is not balanced
by a corresponding decrease in the amount of corporate assets, the power to affect
beneficially the enjoyment of a transferred income interest would appear not to
bring the transfer within the scope of either § 2036(a) (2) or § 2038 of the Code.
See Central Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1948) ; 3 J. MERTENS,
supra note 16, § 25.14.
99. Relevant portion reenacted without substantial change as INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2036(a) (2).
100. Now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038.
101. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
102. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1064. In addition, see the language used by the
court in determining the value of the corporate notes owned by the decedent at
his death:
. . . decedent . . . could at any time acquire legal control by reason of his
option to acquire stock for a nominal price. Thus the decedent could, indirectly,
by waiving interest, cancelling notes, and otherwise administering the financial
transactions of the corporation, divert income to noteholders or stock holders
at his pleasure. ...
The decedent, by exercise of his option to gain control of the corporation
through ownership of a large majority of its stock, could have brought about
the liquidation of the corporation at any time prior to his death and in such
manner obtained payment of his notes. (This would not enable him to recall
or enjoy the stock he had previously transferred.)
Id. at 1066.
103. Cases cited note 84 supra.
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within the meaning of section 2036(a) (2) of the Code,' and a
power to alter or amend, within the meaning of section 2038.1"'
Yeazel v. Coyle'0 6 and Byrum v. United States,10 7 the other cases
in this category, differ from Burr primarily in three respects. First,
the transfers in question were made in trust, whereas in Burr they
were outright.'0 8 Second, they involved an express retention of direct
rights, as well as an implied retention of indirect rights, in or over
the transferred stock, whereas Burr involved only an implied retention
of indirect rights. °9 Third, the decisions therein, unlike that in Burr,
expressly addressed themselves to the argument that a transferor's
retention of voting control of the corporation whose stock he transfers
renders section 2036(a) (2) of the Code applicable to the transfer,
since it enables him to defer the payment of income from the trans-
ferred stock.
In Yeazel, the decedent was the sole stockholder, as well as the
president, of a corporation prior to the transfers in question. In Octo-
ber, 1957, she created an irrevocable trust of approximately fifty-nine
percent" 0 of the issued and outstanding stock of the corporation, for
the benefit alone of four of her relatives. She made herself the sole
trustee thereof and impliedly retained, until her death, the beneficial
ownership of the remaining forty-one percent of the stock and the
presidency of the corporation. In addition, she expressly retained, in
her capacity as trustee, the right to vote the transferred stock, as well
as other so-called administrative powers, such as the right to sell the
stock and invest the proceeds. Consequently she retained the power to
control the disposition of the transferred stock."' Under the terms of
the trust, its entire net income was payable currently to the four named
beneficiaries in equal shares. The entire principal of the trust was
to be distributed to these beneficiaries in equal shares on December
30, 1967, a little more than ten years after the creation of the trust.
Although the opinion in Yeazel did not expressly set forth the disposi-
tion to be made of the trust principal in the event that one or more
of the named beneficiaries failed to survive the trust's termination, it
would seem that the share of a predeceased named beneficiary was
104. Cases cited notes 85 & 86 supra and accompanying text.
105. Cases cited notes 85 & 87 supra and accompanying text.
106. 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
107. 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970),
cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971).
108. The form of the transfer, i.e., whether outright or in trust, is relevant only
to the question of whether the retention of voting control alone has estate tax
consequences. Cases cited notes 176-87 infra and accompanying text.
109. Neither the method by which, nor the capacity in which, voting control is
retained should have any effect upon the estate tax consequences of such retention.
Cases cited notes 188 et seq. infra and accompanying text.
110. 1,680 of the 2,850 issued and outstanding shares of stock of the corporation.
111. She did not, however, expressly retain, in any capacity, any other powers
over the transferred stock; nor did she retain, either expressly or impliedly, any
beneficial interest whatever therein, either direct or indirect.
As the court noted: "All of the income [from the trust] was to be paid
to the named beneficiaries. The corpus of the trust was irrevocably earmarked for
the four beneficiaries. The trust instrument explicitly stated that 'in no event shall
the grantor herein share in the benefits or in any manner enjoy the principal of the
trust estate or income arising therefrom.'" 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524, at 87,386-87.
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payable either to his estate or to the surviving named beneficiaries, -"2
but probably the former. 18 Decedent died in April, 1959. A deficiency
in estate tax was determined, on the ground, inter alia, that the entire
value of the stock transferred by decedent to herself as trustee was
includible in her gross estate under section 2036(a) of the Code." 4
More specifically, the Government contended that, "with her voting
rights in her own stock as well as the stock held by her as trustee,
this placed [the decedent] in the same voting position which she
occupied before the trust agreement, with an ability to control the
corporation, including the distribution of dividends.""' 5 Accordingly,
it was argued that she retained, for a period which did not in fact
end before her death, "the possession or enjoyment of" the transferred
stock, within the meaning of section 2036(a) (1) of the Code, and
"the right . . . to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the [transferred] property or the income therefrom," within the mean-
ing of section 2036(a) (2).
The district court held that no part of the value of the transferred
stock was includible in the decedent's gross estate under either section
2 0 36(a)(1) or section 2036(a)(2) of the Code." 6  In support of
its holding with respect to section 2036(a)(2)," 7 the court stated
only that
[m]y attention is also called to Rev. Rul. 67-54 ...which I am
urged to regard as stating that a grantor with control over both
the dividend policy of a company and the assets of the trust is
able to designate who benefits from the property or income. As
applied to the facts of this case, however, I cannot agree with
this view of the statute since it is clear that only the four named
beneficiaries can benefit from the stock."'
Consequently, the court never in fact reached the specific question of
whether the retention of voting control, either alone or in conjunction
with a power to control the disposition of the transferred stock, is a
section 2 036(a) (2) "right . . . to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom." Rather, its
reasoning was directed only to the general questions of whether a
power can be a section 2036(a) (2) right to designate if the possible
designees constitute a limited class, or if the income beneficiary and
112. According to the court, "[tihe corpus of the trust was irrevocably earmarked
for the four beneficiaries," 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 at 87,386, and "only the
four named beneficiaries can benefit from the stock." Id. at 87,387.
113. See the court's statement that "the beneficiaries were in a position to receive
the economic benefit of the stock since they could use it as security for a loan
which would provide them with cash until the end of the ten year period, at which
time they would receive the stock itself." 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524, at 87,387.
114. The Government also contended that the transfer was made "in contemplation
of death," within the meaning of § 2035.
115. 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524, at 87,386.
116. The court, however, also held that the entire value of the transferred stock
was includible in the decedent's gross estate under § 2035 as a transfer "in
contemplation of death."
117. The court's reasoning in support of its holding with respect to § 2036(a) (1)
is discussed in note 199 infra and the accompanying text.
118. 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524, at 87,387 (emphasis added).
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the remainderman are the same person. Furthermore, to the extent
that it answered these questions in the negative, the court in Yeazel
was clearly incorrect for two reasons. First, since the decision in
Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner,119 the prevailing doctrine has
been that section 2036(a) (2) of the Code applies to a power restricted
to choosing only among a limited class. 120  Second, it seems settled
that section 2 036 (a) (2) applies to a power to accumulate income
even if, due to the fact that the income beneficiary and the remainder-
man are the same person, the power is one to defer the payment of
income to the income beneficiary, rather than one to deny it to him.121
It follows, therefore, that Yeazel, like Burr, cannot be considered as
conclusive authority on the issue of whether corporate voting control
involves a section 203 6 (a) (2) right to designate.
In Byrum, the decedent, prior to the transfers in question, was
the controlling stockholder of three closely-held corporations' 12  and,
apparently, an officer thereof.123  In December, 1958, he created an
irrevocable trust124 of a portion of his stock in each of these corpora-
tions 2 5 for the benefit alone of his children. In so doing, he impliedly
retained until death the beneficial ownership of the remainder of such
stock. In addition, although he designated a corporation as sole trustee,
he expressly retained in his individual capacity the powers to vote the
transferred stock, to veto any sale or other disposition of such stock
by the trustee, to veto investments made by the trustee, and to remove
the named trustee and appoint a successor corporate trustee. 26 As in
Yeaael, the decedent in Byrum had, after the transfer, the right to
vote precisely the same number of shares in each of the corporations
as he could have voted prior to the transfer. In Yeazel, however,
it was the shares held by the decedent as trustee which, of themselves,
constituted voting control of the corporation. In Byrum, on the other
hand, in the case of one of the closely-held corporations, it was the
shares impliedly retained which, of themselves, constituted voting
control. In the case of the other two corporations, it was the decedent's
right to vote the stock he impliedly retained, combined with his ex-
pressly retained right to vote the transferred stock, which gave him
119. 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947).
120. E.g., United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) ; Estate of Cyrus C.
Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3.
121. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Joy v. United States,
404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1966), aff'g and remanding 272 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Mich.
1967) ; Ritter v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.W. Va. 1968). See Struthers
v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955).
122. 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971). More specifically, he owned 1,020 shares of
the 1,440 outstanding shares of stock of one corporation, 478 shares of the 574 out-
standing shares of another corporation, and 595 shares of the 678 outstanding shares
of another corporation. Id. at 953 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
123. 440 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1971) (Phillips, CJ., dissenting).
124. The relevant portions of the trust agreement are set forth in 440 F.2d at
950-51.
125. To wit, he transferred to the trust 165 of his 1,020 shares of one corporation,
276 of his 478 shares of another corporation, and 308 of his 595 shares of another
corporation. Id. at 953 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
126. He did not, however, expressly retain, in any capacity, any other powers
over the transferred stock. Nor, apparently, did he retain, either expressly or
impliedly, any beneficial interest whatever therein, direct or indirect.
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voting control. That is, in the case of the latter two transfers, neither
the shares retained by the decedent nor the shares transferred by him
of themselves constituted voting control.127 Decedent died in Septem-
ber, 1964, and a deficiency in estate tax was determined on the ground
that the entire value of the transferred stock was includible in his
gross estate, under sections 2 0 3 6 (a) (1)128 and 2036(a) (2) of the
Code, by reason of the combination of those powers expressly re-
tained by the decedent under the trust agreement and those resulting
from his implied retention of the balance of his stock interest in the
corporations whose stock he had transferred. With respect to section
2036(a) (2), the Government contended, as it did in Yeaael, "that
since the grantor remained in voting control of the corporation he
could, by electing the Board of Directors, determine dividend policies
and thus the grantor could indirectly regulate or control who enjoyed
the income from the property."12 9 As in Yeazel, the Government
based this contention on Revenue Ruling 67-54,130 which states:
the value of nonvoting corporate stock transferred to a trust is
includible in the gross estate of a deceased grantor ...under sec-
tion 2036 of the Code where the grantor owned the voting stock
for the remainder of his life and was therefore able to control the
income from the transferred property, and where the trustee was
restricted in his power to dispose of the transferred property and
held it at the grantor's death. The grantor thereby retained for
his life or for a period which did not in fact end before his death
the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
transferred property or the income therefrom.3 '
The district court, however, in a decision recently affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held that no part of the value
of the transferred stock was includible in the decedent's gross estate
under either section 2036(a) (1) or section 2036(a) (2) of the Code.
1II. VOTING CONTROL OF THE CORPORATION:
A NONDISCRETIONARY POWER?
A unique approach to the problem of retained voting control
emerged from Byrum. Although the district court's conclusion with
respect to section 2 036(a) (2) that "Revenue Ruling 67-54 cannot
operate to make includible this trust property in the decedent's estate"'u 2
was preceded by quotation of the Yeazel court's reasoning on this
issue,13 it was followed immediately by the court's statement that
"[t]he decedent's power to control the trust property was not without
127. See notes 122 & 125 supra.
128. The Government's contentions with respect to § 2036(a) (1) and the
holdings of both the district court and the court of appeals with respect thereto,
are discussed in note 199 infra and at notes 197-209 infra.
129. 440 F.2d at 952.
130. 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 269.
131. Id. at 270.
132. 311 F. Supp. at 896.
133' Id. The court's language in Yeazel is set forth in full in the text accompany-
ing note 118 supra.
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limitation and the Court considers that sufficient control was relin-
quished, and sufficient checks were retained on what control was
retained, to avoid the application of Section 2036 to the facts in the
instant case. See, generally, Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir.
1947) and 3 J. Merten's Estate and Gift Tax § 24.30. ' ' 134 It would
appear, both from the court's language and from the authorities it
cited, that the primary basis of this holding is that the powers retained
by the decedent were not discretionary; that is, their exercise was
controlled by determinable external standards enforceable by a court
having equity jurisdiction, whereas only a discretionary power can
be a section 2036(a) (2) right to designate. It is not clear, however,
whether the court considered these powers to be nondiscretionary in
the decedent's hands on the theory that the powers expressly retained
by him in his individual capacity over the transferred stock itself were
held by him as a quasi-trustee;la5 or on the theory that the exercise
of his compound power to control corporate dividend policy was
limited indirectly by the fiduciary duty of a corporate board of direc-
tors to all of the shareholders.
In affirming the district court's decision, the court of appeals
apparently relied on both theories. In holding that none of the powers
expressly retained by the decedent over the transferred stock itself -
that is, the power to vote it, the power to veto its sale, and the power
to substitute corporate trustees - rendered the value thereof in-
cludible in his gross estate under section 2036 of the Code, the court
apparently relied on the quasi-trustee theory.13 6 On the other hand,
in holding that the decedent's retention of voting control of the cor-
porations whose stock he transferred did not bring the transfers
within the scope of section 2036(a) (2) irrespective, apparently, of
whether or not such control arose from, or was dependent upon, a
retained right in the decedent to vote the transferred stock, it relied
upon the theory that the exercise of decedent's power was indirectly
limited by the fiduciary duty of the corporations' boards of directors.
On the latter issue the court stated:
the grantor by retaining the voting right of the stock only con-
trolled who could serve as directors of the corporation. These in-
dividual directors would then be under a fiduciary obligation to
exercise sound business judgment in declaring dividends and
could not act in bad faith to the injury of the beneficial owners of
134. 311 F. Supp. at 896.
135. This theory is discussed in detail infra pp. 225-34.
136. 440 F.2d at 952. This holding is discussed infra pp. 222-34. N.B. It is
unclear whether the court so held on the basis of § 2036(a)(1) or § 2036(a)(2)
or both. On the one hand, the court prefaced its holding on this point by stating
that "[t]he Government's principal argument is that the powers retained by grantor
made the value of the shares of stock transferred into trust includible in his estate
because the grantor retained for his life 'the possession or enjoyment of * * * the
property . . . .' 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (1)." 440 F.2d at 952. On the other hand,
of the cases cited by the court in support of its holding, only one, Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929), can possibly be said to stand for the
proposition that the powers retained by the decedent do not constitute "the possession
or enjoyment of . . . the property" within the meaning of § 2036(a) (1) ; the others
all involve the application only of § 2036(a) (2) and/or § 2038.
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the stock. This obligation is governed by an ascertainable standard
and is analogous to the situation which exists in cases where the
grantor retains broad managerial control of a trust... and does not
result in making these assets includible in the grantor's estate.,3 7
To the extent that this language can be said to hold that a trans-
feror's retention of voting control does not invest him with a section
2036(a) (2) right to designate because it does not empower him to
determine corporate dividend policies, it ignores both the realities of
the situation'31 and their heretofore consistent recognition by the
federal courts in estate and gift tax cases.'3 9 Furthermore, to the
extent that this language can be said to hold that a transferor's reten-
tion of voting control does not invest him with a section 2036(a) (2)
right to designate because his resultant power to determine the divi-
dend policies of the corporation, and thereby defer the payment of
income from the transferred stock, is not discretionary, it rests upon
a false analogy. 40 For, while the court was technically correct in stat-
ing that corporate directors are "under a fiduciary obligation . . . in
declaring dividends,"'' this obligation, contrary to the court's asser-
tion, is not "governed by an ascertainable standard" 4' within the
meaning of Jennings v. Smith 4 and its progeny.
Jennings v. Smith established the rule that a power cannot be a
section 203 6 (a) (2) right to designate, or a section 2038 power to
137. 440 F.2d at 952. In addition, the court of appeals stated that, "[w]hile
Revenue Ruling 67-54 . . . strictly construed, is distinguishable from the facts in
this case . . . . [i]nsofar as such Ruling might be applied to the facts of this
case, it is in conflict with the law as interpreted by the courts and should be
disregarded." Id. at 952-53.
138. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, §§ 182, 184c, 185, 337; Hornstein, Corpo-
rate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 3-11, 27-31 (1943) ; Cf.
Murray, Legal and Financial Aspects of Dividend Policy, 23 BAYLOR L. Rav. 7, 13-18
(1971).
139. Reeves' Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 813 (1950) ; Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968) ;
Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, INr. REV. BULL. No.
9, at 6; Richard P. Makoff, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 83 (1967); Elise McK. Morgan,
42 T.C. 1080 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 918 (1966), acquiesced in, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 6; Estate of James Gilbert,
14 T.C. 349 (1950). See Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461, 471 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ;
Rev. Rul. 71-463, 1971 INT. Rxv. BULL. No. 42, at 25, citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-
1(C) (2), approved in Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
Cf., e.g., Fetzer Refrigerator Co. v. United States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1 71-401
(6th Cir. 1971) (involving application of the doctrine of "constructive receipt"
under INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 267(a) (2)).
140. This discussion of the analogy drawn by the court between the retained
voting control situation and "the situation which exists in cases where the grantor
retains broad managerial control of a trust" [Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949,
952 (6th Cir. 1971)] assumes the validity of the court's basic premise that a
transferor's exercise of his retained administrative powers over the property trans-
ferred by him in trust is sufficiently controlled by external standards, enforceable
in equity, to preclude the application to the transfer of either § 2036(a)(2) or
§ 2038 of the Code, regardless of both the capacity in which he holds these powers
and whether they are considered alone or in the aggregate. Whether this premise
in fact is valid is discussed infra pp. 225-34.
141. 440 F.2d at 952.
142. Id.
143. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). This case is cited by both the district court
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in support of their decisions in Byrum.
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alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, unless it is discretionary, and that
it is not discretionary if its exercise is controlled by determinable
external standards, enforceable by a court having equity jurisdiction,
which leave the holder of the power no real discretion in its exercise.144
It does not follow, however, despite some apparent authority to the
contrary,' 45 that every power whose exercise can be compelled, pre-
vented or reviewed by a court of equity is, for that reason, limited
by a determinable external standard within the meaning of this rule
and, therefore, nondiscretionary. It is true that equity can control the
exercise of every power, mandatory or discretionary, which is held
subject to a fiduciary obligation with respect to its exercise by review-
ing such exercise, and compelling or preventing it in order to remedy
a breach of duty or an abuse of discretion;46 and that all trustees are
under a fiduciary obligation with respect to the exercise of all powers,
whether mandatory or discretionary, held by them as such.' 47 It is
clear, however, that the fact that a transferor retains powers over the
transferred property as a trustee, rather than in his individual capacity,
will not, of itself, prevent the application of either section 2036(a) (2)
or section 2038 of the Code.148 From the authorities 149 requiring in-
clusion on the basis of powers which are held in a fiduciary capacity,
it necessarily follows that no power whose exercise is controlled only
by those criteria by which all fiduciary powers are controlled is limited
by a determinable external standard within the meaning of Jennings
v. Smith. In other words, in order to be nondiscretionary, a fiduciary
power must be subject to limitations other than, or in addition to,
those imposed equally upon all fiduciary powers.
Of the three criteria used by equity to determine whether the
holder of a fiduciary power has abused his discretion in exercising or
failing to exercise it, two - that he must act (or fail to act) in good
faith and from proper motives - apply equally to all fiduciary
powers, 5 ° and therefore, do not render them nondiscretionary. The
third criterion, however - that the holder of a fiduciary power must
act within the bounds of reasonable judgment' - applies only if
there is a standard by which the reasonableness of the power-holder's
judgment can be determined. 152 If there is no such standard, or if the
requirement of reasonableness is dispensed with by the terms of the
144. E.g., Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960).
145. Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1
CuM. BULL. 5. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir.
1970) ; Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd. per curiam, 71-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 1 12,813 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1971) ; Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140
(1967).
146. 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 185 (3d ed. 1967) ; 3 A. SCOTT, supra,§§ 185A-87.5.
147. 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 146, § 185; 3 A. ScotT, supra, §§ 185A-87.5.
148. E.g., Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g and remanding
272 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Mich. 1967). See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 383
U.S. 627 (1966); Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) ; Treas. Reg.§§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3), 20.2038-1 (a) (3).
149. Cases cited note 148 supra.
150. 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 146, § 185; 3 A. ScoTT, supra, §§ 187-87.5.
151. See note 150 supra.
152. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 146, § 187.2.
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instrument creating the power, only the first two criteria will apply."' 3
It follows then that only those fiduciary powers to which the third
criterion applies can be considered nondiscretionary, and not even all
of these are in fact controlled by determinable external standards
within the meaning of Jennings v. Smith.' Moreover, it would seem
that, even if there is a standard by which to judge the reasonableness
of the power-holder's judgment, the power is not nondiscretionary
unless equity will in fact remedy a failure to act in accordance with
these standards as well as a failure to act in good faith or from
proper motives. 55
The basic defect in the court's reasoning in Byrum was the
drawing of an analogy between the situation where the only powers
retained are those which constitute "broad managerial control" of a
trust 5 6 and the situation where corporate voting control is retained.
The two situations are in fact only partly analogous. Just as a trustee
holds his powers subject to a fiduciary obligation with respect to their
exercise, so does a holder of corporate voting control - both directly,
as "majority shareholder,"'5 7 and indirectly, by reason of the fact that
he thereby can control the actions of the board of directors, which
itself has a fiduciary obligation to the shareholders.' To this extent,
therefore, a retention of corporate voting control is analogous to a
retention of managerial control of a trust. The analogy breaks down,
however, when it is asserted that the exercise of both types of powers
is controlled by determinable external standards that are enforceable
in equity. In the situation in which managerial control of a trust is
retained, regardless of the merits of the position that the powers con-
stituting such control are nondiscretionary, it is clear that there are
standards by which the reasonableness of the power-holder's judgment
can be determined, and that equity in fact will remedy a failure to
act in accordance with these standards, as well as a failure to act in
good faith or from proper motives. 5 9 For example, it has been held
more often than not that one such standard is that the exercise of a
trustee's managerial powers should not affect the relative rights of the
income beneficiaries and remaindermen.
1 60
On the other hand, there is grave doubt as to whether there in
fact are standards by which to judge the reasonableness of the action
153. Id.
154. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960). Compare,
e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970), Estate
of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967), and Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C.
1164 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3, with 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 146,§ 187.2.
155. See United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Estate of
Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967).
156. E.g., the powers to sell, veto or direct the sale of, retain, invest and reinvest
the property transferred in trust; to allocate the receipts between income and
principal; and to vote securities held as part of the trust principal.
157. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, § 278, at 655; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
158. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, § 66; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
159. 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 146, § 187.2; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
160. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970) ; United
States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962). See, e.g., Estate of Ralph Budd,
49 T.C. 468 (1968). Contra, State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635(1st Cir. 1959).
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of a corporate board of directors in declaring or failing to declare
dividends. 6' Moreover, equity normally will remedy only those abuses
of discretion by corporate directors arising from actions in bad faith
or from improper motives 6 2 - and then only in "very clear and
extreme cases."' 6 3 For example, although it can be said that corporate
directors are "under a fiduciary obligation to exercise sound business
judgment in declaring dividends,"' 64
[t]he mere fact that a corporation reports a substantial surplus
or large profits out of which a dividend might lawfully be declared
is not of itself sufficient ground to compel the directors to make a
dividend. They have a wide discretion to use the corporate re-
sources to expand the business, to increase executive compensa-
tion by bonuses and profit sharing contracts and to establish
various reserves if they consider it to the interests of the cor-
poration to do so."65
In fact "[t]he courts hesitate to substitute their judgment on compli-
cated questions of business policy for that of the elected managers of
the business," '1 66 with the result that this obligation, in practice,
amounts to little more than a requirement that the directors act in
good faith and from proper motives.'67 Thus, while
[t]here is an obligation implied, and to some slight extent equi-
tably enforced, to exercise not only good faith but also a rea-
sonable business discretion in the distribution of available profits
to the investor ... the great practical difficulty of regulating the
exercise of this managerial discretion leaves the shareholder with
no clearly defined right to a return but rather an indefinite ex-
pectation that the directors will do the right thing by them on
grounds of business policy. 68
Hence, in the retained voting control situation, unlike the retained
trust control situation, there appear to be no ascertainable standards
for determining the reasonableness of the directors' judgment, in
declaring or failing to declare dividends, which equity in fact will
enforce. Consequently, the power to defer the payment of income from
the transferred stock, which results from the transferor's retention of
corporate voting control, clearly is not nondiscretionary within the
rule in Jennings v. Smith. Therefore, since the court of appeals de-
cision in Byrum with respect to the effect of a retention of corporate
voting control rests upon the validity of an analogy between this situa-
tion and the one in which managerial control of a trust is retained,
Byrum, like Burr and Yeazel, cannot be considered as conclusive on
161. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, §§ 231, 232.
162. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, §§ 231, 232; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
163. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, § 231, at 551; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
164. Byrum v. United States, 440 F. 2d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1971). See H.
BALLANTINE, supra note 98, §§ 231, 232.
165. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, § 231, at 552; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
166. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, § 231, at 552; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
167. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, §§ 231, 232; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
168. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 98, § 231, at 551; cf. Murray, supra note 138.
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the issue of whether corporate voting control involves a section
203 6 (a) (2) right to designate.
Despite the fact that a transferor's retention of corporate voting
control appears to be sufficient of itself to bring the transfer within
the scope of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 of the Code,169 at least
if such retention is implied,17° there is some authority to the effect that
his resultant power to defer the payment of income from the transferred
stock cannot be a section 2036(a) (2) right to designate or a section
2038 power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate unless, at the very
least, the transferred stock is unmarketable or its disposition is sub-ject to control by the transferor. 7' In Estate of Harry H. Beck-
with,'72 for example, the court held that no part of the value of the
stock which the decedent had transferred in trust was includible in
his gross estate under either section 2036 (a) ( 1 ) or section 2036 (a) (2)
of the Code, even though the decedent had retained voting control of
the corporation from the inception of the trusts until his death. With
respect to the applicability of section 2036(a) (2) the court stated:
the trustees were free to sell the [transferred] stock. The right
to control the dividend policy of a corporation can be a right to
designate the income recipient of a trust holding its stock only
if the corporation is of necessity a source of the trust income.
Where a third-party trustee has unfettered power to dispose of
the stock, then the donor retains no right to designate the income
recipient of the trust; any influence which he may have over the
disposition of the trust income depends on the will of a third party,
i.e., a decision to retain the stock.'73
Likewise, according to Revenue Ruling 67-54:'
Where a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds
for the remainder of his life voting stock giving him control over
the dividend policy of the corporation, he has retained . . . the
right to determine the income from the nonvoting stock. If he
also retains control over the disposition of the nonvoting stock,
169. Since it enables him to defer the payment of income from the transferred
stock. Cases cited notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
170. If such retention is express, either in whole or in part, so that the
transferor's voting control arises from, or is dependent upon, a right retained by him
to vote the transferred stock, it gives rise to the additional question of whether the
transferor's resultant power to determine corporate dividend policy thereby is
rendered nondiscretionary and, therefore, not within the scope of either § 2036(a) (2)
or § 2038. This question is discussed infra pp. 225-34.
171. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT.
REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6. See Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,524 (N.D.Ill. 1968) ; Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 269. Cf. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397
F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 834 (1967), nonacquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 344,1969-1 Cum. BULL. 225; Richard P. Makoff, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 83 (1967);
Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
172. 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
173. CCH 1970 TAX CT. REP. (55 T.C.) Dec. No. 30,401, at 3,463. N.B. Thequoted language is in the nature of dictum. The basis of decision in the Beckwith
case was that the decedent did not retain his voting control of the corporation.
174. 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 269.
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whether as trustee, [or] by restriction upon the trustee . . . he
has in fact made a transfer whereby he has retained for his life
the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
transferred property or the income therefrom.175
It should be noted, however, that the principle enunciated in the above
quotations from Beckwith and Revenue Ruling 67-54 applies only to
transfers in trust. Moreover, only to the extent that its application
is so limited does this principle appear to be a correct construction of
sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 of the Code.
As previously demonstrated, an inter vivos transfer of stock under
which the transferor retains voting control of the corporation literally
is "a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, under which [the transferor]
has retained ... the right ... to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom,' 7 6 since such reten-
tion enables the transferor to defer the payment of income from the
transferred stock. Likewise, and for the same reasons, this type of
transfer literally is "a transfer . . . where the enjoyment [of the
property interest transferred] was subject . . . to . . . change through
the exercise of a power ... to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate ....
Consequently, the only possible basis for holding that such a transfer
is not within the scope of section 2036(a) (2) or section 2038, regard-
less of whether it is outright or in trust, unless the transferred stock
is unmarketable or its disposition is subject to control by the trans-
feror, is that for these sections of the Code to apply, it is not sufficient
that the transferor retain merely the power "to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom, '17
or the power to change the enjoyment of the property interest trans-
ferred.'7 9 Rather, he must retain the power to affect adversely his
transferee's possession or enjoyment of "the [transferred] property
or the income therefrom,'1 8 0 or the power to change his transferee's
enjoyment of the property interest transferred.' 8 ' Therefore, for his
control over the transferred property or its income to be a power to
affect his transferee's enjoyment thereof, the transferor must have
the power to prevent his transferee from disposing of the transferred
property or his interest therein and thereby obtaining the unrestricted
economic benefit thereof.
This theory clearly is untenable. There is no express require-
ment, in either section 2036(a) (2) or section 2038, that the trans-
feror must retain a power to affect his transferee's enjoyment of the
transferred property or its income. Nor can any be implied, since it
appears that sections 2036 and 2038 apply in cases in which the trans-
ferred interest is freely transferable by the transferee without the
175. Id. at 270.
176. 1NT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 2036(a) (2).
177. Id. § 2038(a) (1).
178. Id. § 2036(a) (2).
179. Id. § 2038(a) (1).
180. Id. § 2036(a) (2).
181. Id. § 2038(a)(1).
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transferor's consent.18 2 Moreover, it even appears that these sections
apply where the transferred interest is disposed of by the transferee
prior to the death of the transferor, 8 3 unless such disposition elimi-
nates the transferor's control over the transferred property or the
income therefrom.18 4
Nonetheless, it would appear that Beckwith and Revenue Ruling
67-54 are correct in asserting that, where a transferor retains voting
control of the corporation and the transfer is in trust, neither section
2036(a) (2) nor section 2038 of the Code will apply to the transfer
unless the transferred stock is unmarketable or its disposition is sub-
ject to control by the transferor. This follows from the theory, applied
consistently in cases involving problems of valuation under the transfer
sections of the Code, 8 5 that where a transfer is made in trust, "the
assets considered to be transferred are not the specific assets compris-
ing the trust corpus but rather the corpus itself."'8 6 Thus the con-
clusion is compelled that if the property transferred is the trust corpus
rather than the specific property comprising it, and the transferor's
retained control pertains only to the specific property transferred, such
control cannot be deemed to be control of the property transferred
within the meaning of the transfer sections of the Code unless the
specific property necessarily forms part of the trust corpus. This rea-
soning, however, does not apply where the transfer is outright rather
than in trust since, in this situation, the property transferred is the
specific property over which the transferor retains control."s It fol-
lows, therefore, that a transferor's retention of voting control of a
corporation of itself renders sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 of the Code
applicable to outright transfers, at least if such retention is implied.
182. See Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946) (upholding application
of § 811(c) of the 1939 Code (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (1)) to an
irrevocable assignment of the insurance portion of a life insurance-annuity combination,
the assignee having the power to reassign or surrender the insurance policy),
overruled on other grounds, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274
(1958) ; Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942) (upholding applica-
tion of a precursor of § 2038 of the Code to a revocable outright transfer of property
thereafter disposed of by the transferee) ; Peek v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 826
(E.D. Pa. 1941) (upholding application of precursor of § 2036(a) (1) to an outright
transfer of realty under which the grantor reserved a ground rent for life, the grantees
having not only the right to dispose of the transferred realty itself, but also the
right to extinguish the ground rent upon payment to the grantor of a stated sum).
Cf. Estate of Lillie G. Hutchinson, 20 T.C. 749 (1953). But cf. Smith v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo. 1957). N.B. While no case in point involving
§ 2036(a) (2) has been found, "the power to designate income or possession under
Section 2036(a) (2)" must be equated "with the direct retention of income or
possession under Section 2036(a) (1)." C. LowNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 3,
at 160.
183. Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942) (involving application
of a precursor of § 2038 of the Code). Cf. Estate of Lillie G. Hutchinson, 20 T.C.
749 (1953) (involving application of a precursor of § 2036(a) (1)).
184. See Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942); Estate of
Lillie G. Hutchinson, 20 T.C. 749 (1953).
185. Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968) ; C. LOWNDES
& R. KRAMER, supra note 3, at 435; 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 16, § 22.79.
186. Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1968). Accord,
C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 3, at 435; 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 16,
§ 22.79.
187. Authorities cited note 185 supra.
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IV. THE EXPRESS RETENTION OF DIRECT RIGHTS IN OR OVER THE
TRANSFERRED STOCK ITSELF: DISCRETIONARY VS.
NONDISCRETIONARY POWERS
The focus of attention to this point for the most part has been
restricted to the estate tax consequences of a transferor's retention of
indirect rights in or over the transferred stock by virtue of his implied
retention of voting control of the corporation whose stock he trans-
ferred. More complicated, however, is the problem of a transferor's
express retention of direct rights in or over the transferred stock itself.
Such direct rights may consist of powers, exercisable in either a fiduci-
ary or nonfiduciary capacity, to vote the transferred stock or to control
its disposition. In addition, they also may consist of administrative
powers over the transferred stock which are exercisable only in a
fiduciary capacity. Under a given transfer these direct rights may
constitute the only powers retained by the transferor, or they may be
in addition to indirect rights expressly or impliedly retained by
the transferor.
Although a transfer characterized by the express retention of
one or more of the above-mentioned direct rights in or over the trans-
ferred stock itself should not bring the transfer within the scope of
section 2036 (a) (1) of the Code, such retention very well may cause
the application of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 to the transfer. The
application of these latter sections of the Code should depend on the
following additional factors: the form of the transfer, the particular
rights retained, whether the transferor prior to the transfer was the
controlling shareholder of the corporation, and the portion of the
transferor's stock interest that is transferred.
The Government has long and persistently contended that an
inter vivos transfer of closely-held corporate stock, under which the
transferor retains voting control of the corporation whose stock is trans-
ferred, is a "transfer . . . under which . . . he has retained . . . the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the [trans-
ferred] property,"'88 at least if such control arises from or is dependent
upon a retained right to vote the transferred stock."8 9 The Government
also has contended, with equal vigor and perseverance, that regardless
of whether he retains voting control of the corporation, if the transferor
in connection with his transfer of stock retains the right to receive an
income from the corporation pursuant to a contract for his employment
in a managerial capacity, he likewise has retained "the possession or
188. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (1).
189. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel v.
Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Il1. 1968) ; Estate of Harry H. Beckwith,
55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL.. No. 9, at 6; Estate of
William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 542, modified, 4 T.C. 790 (1945), acquiesced in and
nonacquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL. 4, 8; Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A.
807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564 (1943). Cf. Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A.
496 (1928). The question of whether voting control of a corporation involves "the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from" its transferred stock,
within the meaning of § 2036(a)(1) of the Code, where such control results solely
from the transferor's implied retention of the right to vote corporate stock other
than that transferred by him, is discussed supra p. 204.
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enjoyment of, or the right to the income from the [transferred] prop-
erty," within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1) of the Code. 9 '
Yet perseverance, like other virtues, must be its own reward. With
but one exception,' 9 ' the courts uniformly have held these contentions
to be without merit ;192 and insofar as their results are concerned, these
decisions clearly are correct.
It is basic corporation law that a transferor of stock, who retains
only the powers to vote it and to control its disposition, or other
"administrative" powers over it, and even, perhaps, indirect rights as
well, has not retained "the right to the income" therefrom, even if he
thereby retains voting control of the corporation. 1 93  Consequently, in
order for such a transfer to be taxable under section 2036(a) (1) of
the Code, the powers so retained would have to be deemed to constitute
"the possession or enjoyment of" the transferred stock, within the
meaning of this section. As previously demonstrated,' 9 4 it is well-
established that in order for a retained interest to be "the possession
or enjoyment of" the transferred property, within the meaning of section
2036(a) (1), it must be a beneficial interest 95 in a pecuniary sense."'
Thus, in order for a transferor to be deemed to have retained "the
possession or enjoyment of" the transferred property, he must be shown
to have retained the "substantial present economic benefit"' 9 7 thereof.
190. Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 769 (1951) ; Estate
of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 542, modified, 4 T.C. 790 (1945), acquiesced in and
nonacquiesced in, 1945 Cum. BULL. 4, 8; Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A.
807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564 (1943). Cf. Estate of Meyer Goldberg, 10 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1951).
191. Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564
(1943). See Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
192. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ; Yeazel
v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Estate of William L.
Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 769 (1951); Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C.
542, modified, 4 T.C. 790 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL.
4, 8. Cf. Estate of Meyer Goldberg, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1951); Estate of
James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496 (1928). But see Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C.
242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL No. 9, at 6.
193. Compare Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959) (interpreting the phrase "the right to the income
from, the [transferred] property"), with Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892
(S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219
(U.S. Nov. 9, 1971), and Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (elucidating the nature of the rights accruing to the holder of corporate voting
control).
194. Cases cited notes 75-77 supra and accompanying text.
195. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.
Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963). See Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949).
acquiesced in, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3; Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790,
modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL.
4, 8.
196. See cases cited notes 75-77 supra and Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (2).
197. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959). Accord, Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892
(S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219
222
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It seems clear, however, that even his retention of all of the above-
enumerated powers 198 does not endow the transferor with a pecuniary
benefit from the transferred stock,'"9 regardless of whether he thereby
retains voting control of the corporation'" and, if he does, regardless
of whether such control arises from, 20 1 is dependent upon,20 2 or is in-
(U.s. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968)
Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
198. The power to vote the transferred stock, the power to veto or otherwise
control its disposition and other administrative powers and indirect rights thereover.
199. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Byrum v. United
States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524
(N.D. I1. 1968). See Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496 (1928). But see
Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 9, at 6. N.B. Of the cases which hold that a transferor's retention of
the powers enumerated in note 198 supra was not the retention of a beneficial interest
in the transferred stock, and, therefore, was not the retention of "the possession or
enjoyment" thereof, within the meaning of § 2036 (a) (1) of the Code, at most two
[Yeazel v. Coyle, supra, and, possibly, the district court opinion in Byrum v. United
States, supra,] apparently so held on the theory that the transferor's retained powers
gave him no pecuniary benefit from the transferred stock. The holding in Estate
of Harry H. Beckwith, supra, was based upon the court's finding that the trans-
feror's powers were not retained by him under the transfer. Estate of William F.
Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in,
1945 CuM. BULL. 4, 8, and Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971),
aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), apparently so held on the theory that the
transferor's retained powers to vote the transferred stock and to control its dis-
position, were nondiscretionary, since they were held by him in a fiduciary capacity
and were, therefore, nonbeneficial. There are indications, moreover, that Yeazel was
decided, insofar as § 2036(a) (1) is concerned, on the nondiscretionary power theory
rather than on the nonpecuniary benefit theory. Compare Yeazel v. Coyle, supra,
eith the district court opinion in Byrum v. United States, supra. Although the
result reached in Byrum, Yeazel and Hofford with respect to the applicability of
§ 2036(a) (1) are correct, the reasoning upon which they are based is erroneous
to the extent that it is dependent upon the nondiscretionary power theory. This
certainly is true in Byrum, wherein the transferor's powers were retained by him
in his individual capacity and, after the transfer, he continued to own beneficially
a substantial amount of stock of the corporations whose stock he transferred.
This probably is also true in both Hofford, wherein the transferor's powers were
retained by him as trustee of the trust to which he transferred all of the issued
and outstanding corporate stock, and in Yeazel, wherein the transferor's powers
were retained by her as trustee of the trust to which she transferred the majority
of the issued and outstanding corporate stock. The validity of this reasoning is
discussed infra pp. 225-34.
200. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929) (voting control not
retained); Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) (voting
control retained); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-4 U.S. Tax Cas. f 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968)
(voting control retained); Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 542, modified,
4 T.C. 790 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL. 4, 8 (voting
control retained). See Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 769
(1951) (voting control not retained) ; Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496
(1928) (voting control not retained).
201. Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Estate
of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 542, modified, 4 T.C. 790 acquiesced in and non-
acquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BuLL. 4, 8. In both cases the stock transferred by the
decedents to themselves as trustees constituted voting control of the respective
corporations.
202. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) (insofar as
two of the three corporations involved were concerned, neither the transferred stock
which the transferor retained the right to vote, nor the stock whose ownership was
retained by him constituted voting control, although his combined right to vote both
the transferred stock and the stock retained did constitute voting control).
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dependent of2"' his retained right to vote the transferred stock. More-
over, even if it be conceded that the right to vote the transferred stock
is of substantial present economic benefit to the transferor, either be-
cause it enables him to enjoy the power represented by the transferred
stock, °4 or because it enables him to control the distribution of
dividends, 0 5 or because it "assured [the transferor] a position as a
salaried officer of the corporations for as long as he desired . . . [and]
[h]e could increase his salary or fringe benefits . . . [and] could con-
trol all corporate decisions affecting him financially, ' 20 6 such right can-
not be deemed to be "the possession or enjoyment of" the transferred
stock. For where, as here, the property transferred is income-producing
property, it would appear that the transferor must retain the income
from the transferred property for him to be held to have retained
"the possession or enjoyment" thereof.207 As was stated in Estate of
McNichol v. Commissioner,2° 8 "[i]f, as was said in Commissioner v.
Estate of Church . . . the most valuable property attribute of stocks is
their income, it is no less true that one of the most valuable incidents
of income-producing real estate is the rent which it yields. He who
receives the rent in fact enjoys the property."20' This conclusion is
supported further by the line of cases involving a transferor who, in
connection with his transfer of closely-held corporate stock, enters into
a contract for his employment by the corporation in a managerial
capacity at a stated salary, either in addition to, or instead of, retaining
voting control of the corporation. These cases 210 properly hold that the
contractual arrangement is not the retention of "the possession or en-
joyment of, or the right to the income from" the transferred stock,
within the meaning of section 2036(a) (1), so long as the salary stipu-
lated is reasonable and is a debt of the corporation rather than a charge
upon the transferred stock. 1 '
On the other hand, a transferor's express retention of the right to
vote the transferred stock should, despite the uniform case authority
203. Id. (insofar as one of the three corporations involved was concerned, the
stock whose ownership was retained by the transferor constituted voting control).
204. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
205. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel
v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
206. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1971) (Phillips, C.J., dis-
senting), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971).
207. See Commissioner v. Estate of Church 335 U.S. 632, 645 (1949); Estate
of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 61 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 829 (1959); Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.
Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (b) (3).
208. 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959).
209. 265 F.2d at 671.
210. Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 769 (1951) ; Estate
of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 542, modified, 4 T.C. 790 (1945), acquiesced in and
nonacquiesced in, 1945 Cum. BULL. 4, 8. Cf. Estate of Meyer Goldberg, 10 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 977 (1951). Compare Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807
(1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564 (1943), with the cases cited srupra.
211. It appears to be well established that a retained right to income is not the
"right to the income from" the transferred property unless it is a charge upon the
transferred property itself. Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952),
aff'd on this point and vacated and remanded in part, 204 F.2d 855 (Ist Cir. 1953).
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to the contrary,212 bring the transfer within the scope of sections
2036(a) (2) and 2038 of the Code, provided the transferor thereby
retains voting control of the corporation, at least if he also retains the
right to control the disposition of the transferred stock. As previously
shown, a transferor's implied retention of corporate voting control
should render his transfer of closely-held corporate stock subject to
these sections of the Code - of itself, if the transfer is outright, or,
if the transfer is in trust, provided the transferred stock is unmarket-
able or its disposition is subject to the transferor's control. Conse-
quently, where the transferor's retention of voting control arises from
or is dependent upon his express retention of the right to vote the
transferred stock, the case would appear to be even stronger for the
application of section 2036(a) (2), since the question of whether the
transferor's powers over the transferred stock in fact were retained
under the transfer thereby is eliminated.
Most of the minute case authority involving the express retention
of direct rights in or over the transferred stock has held or implied
that the application of section 2036 cannot be based upon the trans-
feror's powers to vote the transferred stock and control its disposition
because such powers are nondiscretionary in his hands, within the
meaning of Jennings v. Smith,21 3 regardless of whether the transferor
retained them in his individual capacity or as trustee.2"14 This reason-
ing apparently is based upon two theories, neither of which properly
can be applied to a controlling shareholder's express retention of direct
rights in or over the transferred stock. The first of these is that a
transferor who retains "administrative" or managerial powers over
property transferred by him in trust holds such powers subject to a
212. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892
(S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971); Yeazel
v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,524 (N.D. I1. 1968). Cf. Estate of William
F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced
in, 1945 Cum. BULL. 4, 8; Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496 (1928). But see
Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 9, at 6. Cf. Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
213. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). This rule is discussed supra at notes 144-47.
214. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp.
892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) (so
held with respect to both § 2 036(a) (1) and § 2036(a) (2) of the Code; transferor
not trustee) ; Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (so
held with respect to § 2036(a) (1) ; refusal to apply § 2036(a) (2) erroneously based
on the fact that only the named transferees could benefit from the transferred stock
[discussed supra at notes 116-121] ; transferor trustee) ; Estate of Harry H. Beckwith,
55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6 (could be said
to so imply with respect to § 2036(a) (2) ; refusal to apply § 2036 in fact based
on transferor's failure to retain the powers in question; transferor trustee of some,
but not all, of the transferred stock) ; Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790,
modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 Cum. BULL.
4, 8 (so held with respect to a precursor of § 2036(a)(1); § 2036(a)(2) not
involved; transferor trustee). But cf. Estate of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950)
(transfer outright; transferor retained the power to control the disposition of the
transferred stock; transferee bound to will the stock to the corporation at her death;
unclear whether the transferor had the right to vote the transferred stock; §§
2036(a) (1) and 2037 held applicable); Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496
(1928) (transfer outright; transferor retained right to vote transferred stock;
transfer held not one made to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the transferor's death, since transfer made prior to effective date of the taxing act).
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fiduciary obligation with respect to their exercise, regardless of whether
he holds them in his individual capacity or as trustee. 215  The second,
which is dependent upon the first,2 16 is that a transferor's retention of
"administrative" or managerial powers over property transferred by
him in trust does not, of itself, bring the transfer within the scope of
either section 2036(a) (2) or section 2038 of the Code, 217 regardless
215. Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 12,524 (N.D. II. 1968) (transferor
trustee) ; Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (transferor
not trustee) ; Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967) (transferor trustee) ;
Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 CuM. BULL.
5 (transferor not trustee); Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying
4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL. 4, 8 (trans-
feror trustee) ; 2 A. ScoTT, supra, note 146, § 185. But see Estate of Harry H.
Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
216. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 146, § 185. See, e.g., Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753
(E.D.N.Y. 1945) ; Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in,
1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967) ;
Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 CuM. BULL.
5; Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced
in and nonacquiesced in, 1945 Cum. BULL. 4, 8.
217. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971) aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892
(S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) (transferor
not trustee; transferor retained in individual capacity powers to vote the transferred
stock and veto its disposition by trustee; § 2036(a) (2) held inapplicable); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970) (transferor as
trustee retained broad administrative or management powers over the trust; such
powers held not to render either § 2036(a) (2) or § 2038 of the Code applicable
to the transfer, although these sections were held applicable to the transfer on other
grounds) ; United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962) (transferor as
trustee retained the power to control investment of the trust property, § 2038 held
inapplicable); Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (transferor
not trustee; transferor retained in individual capacity the power to control investment
of the trust property; § 2038 held inapplicable) ; Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C.
114 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,813 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1971)
(transferor as trustee retained the powers to direct the investment and sale of the
trust property, to vote stock held in trust, and to allocate trust receipts between
income and principal; §§ 2036(a) (2) and 2038 held inapplicable); Estate of Ralph
Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968) (transferor as trustee retained the powers to direct the
investment and sale of the trust property and to allocate trust receipts between
income and principal; §§ 2036(a) (2) and 2038 held inapplicable); Estate of Marvin
L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967) (transferor as trustee retained the power to allocate
trust receipts between income and principal; § 2036 (a) (2) held inapplicable) ; Estate
of James H. Graham, 46 T.C. 415 (1966) (transferor as trustee retained the power
to control the investment and sale of the trust property; § 2038 held inapplicable);
Estate of Aline Peters Peters, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964) (transferor as trustee
retained broad administrative and managerial powers over the trust property; §§
2036 (a) (2) and 2038 held inapplicable); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973
(1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 5 (transferor not trustee; transferor
retained in individual capacity the powers to direct the management, investment and
sale of the trust property and to direct the voting by the trustee of all stock held as
part of the trust property; §§ 2036(a) (2) and 2038 held inapplicable); Estate of
George W. Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946), acquiesced in, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 3 (transferor
not trustee; transferor retained, in individual capacity, the power to direct the
investment of the trust property; precursor of § 2038 held inapplicable); Estate of
Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943), petition for review dismissed nolle pros. (2d
Cir. June 1, 1944), nonacquiesced in, 1944 CuM. BULL. 37 (transferor not trustee;
transferor retained in individual capacity the powers to direct the investment and
sale of the trust property and to vote all stock held in trust; precursor of § 2038
held inapplicable) ; Estate of Laura B. Alexander, 2 Tax Ct. Mem. 1156 (1943)
(transferor not trustee; transferor retained in individual capacity power to direct
the sale and investment of the trust property; transfer held not to be one made
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the transferor's death). Contra,
State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959) (transferor as
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of whether such powers are considered individually or in the aggre-gate, 218 since their exercise is limited by ascertainable external stand-
ards, enforceable in equity.219
The first of the above theories clearly is valid as a general rule. 220
In fact, even if the transfer is outright, the transferor's retained power
to vote the transferred stock or to control its disposition may be heldto be a power of attorney,22' whose exercise by him would be subject
to a fiduciary obligation.2 22 It is equally clear, however, that a trans-feror who reserves to himself in his individual capacity "administra-
tive" or managerial powers over the transferred property is not under
a fiduciary obligation with respect to their exercise if he is found tohave retained such powers solely for his own benefit, regardless of
whether the transfer is outright or in trust.228  In such a case, thetransferor's exercise of the power is subject to no equitable control
whatsoever.2 24 Furthermore, despite some apparent authority to the
contrary,225 it would appear that the beneficial nature of the transferor's
retained powers can be implied from the surrounding circumstances.2
It need not be express. In fact, according to Scott on Trusts,
trustee retained broad administrative and managerial powers over the trust property;powers, considered as a whole, held to require application of § 2036(a) (2) ; by implica-tion, § 2038 likewise applicable). But see Commissioner v. Hager's Estate, 173 F.2d613 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'g and remanding 5 Tax Ct Mem. 972 (1946), appealdismissed, 337 U.S. 937 (1949). Cf. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242(1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6.218. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971) aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892(S.D. Ohio 1970), cert granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) (powersconsidered individually); Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601(1st Cir. 1970) (powers considered in the aggregate); Estate of Edward E. Ford,53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,813 (2d Cir. Nov. 12,1971) (powers considered individually and in the aggregate) ; Estate of Ralph Budd,49 T.C. 468 (1968) (powers considered individually and in the aggregate); Estateof Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 5(powers considered in the aggregate). Contra, State St. Trust Co. v. United States,263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959) (powers considered in the aggregate held to requireapplication of § 2036 (a) (2) and, inferentially, § 2038 even though powers con-sidered individually would not require application of these sections).219. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971) (by implication),aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S.Nov. 9, 1971); Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir.1970); United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Fifth Ave. Bankv. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) ; Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114(1969), aff'd per curiam, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas, 12,813 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1971);Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968) (by implication); Estate of Marvin L.Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962),nonacquiesced in 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 5 Contra, State St Trust Co. v. United States,263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). But cf. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242(1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 6.220. Authorities cited note 215 supra.221. Estate of James F. Foster, 13 B.T.A. 496 (1928).222. G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 15,481 (2d ed. 1965, 1960).223. Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); 2 A. ScoTT,
supra note 146, § 185.
224. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 146, § 185.225. Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945). According tothe district court, "[t]o be exercisable for the sole benefit of the settlor, the powermust be express and unambiguous; it cannot be implied." Id. at 757.226. 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 146, § 185. Cf. Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner,70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,688 (6th Cir. June 3, 1970), aff'g 50 T.C. 915 (1968);Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970, 981 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
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•.. if the settlor owned all of the stock of a corporation and created
a trust of half the stock for the benefit of his children, and provided
that the trustee should not sell the stock without his consent, he
would not be under any duty to the beneficiaries to consent even
though the sale would be clearly advantageous to the trust, since
it is fair to suppose that he reserved the power to prevent a sale
for the purpose of protecting his own interest in the stock which
he retained.227
This statement, moreover, applies with cqual acevracy where the trans-
feror retains the power to vote the transferred stock regardless of
whether he also retains the nower to control its disposition.
It follows, therefore, that where a transferor of stock retains a
beneficial interest in the corporation. whether in votin- or nonvoting
stock, his retained power to vote the t-ansferred stock or to control
its disposition should be deemed beneficial in his hands, and there-
fore nonfiduciary, at least where the transferred stock is voting stock
and the transferor has voting contrni of the corporation after the
transfer. For in this situation, as in Scott's example, it must be pre-
sumed that the transferor retained his powers over the transferred
stock to protect his beneficial interest in the stock he retained. Like-
wise, where the transferor transfers his entire stock interest, his re-
tained powers to vote the transferred stock and to control its disposition
should be considered beneficial in his hands, and therefore nonfiduciary,
at least if they invest him with voting control of the corporation. In
this situation, it must be presumed that the transferor retained his
powers over the transferred stock in order to preserve his power to be
or become a director or officer of the corporation, which offices carry
with them substantial economic benefits, as well as corporate control.228
If the transferred stock is nonvoting stock, the transferor's express
retention of the power to control its disposition, when considered in
conjunction with his implied retention of voting control, requires the
raising of a presumption that the power to control its disposition was
retained either to give him unrestricted control over his transferee's
enjoyment of the income from the stock transferred, 29 which is an
absolutely discretionary power to accumulate or distribute income, or
to protect his own beneficial interest in the corporation, or both. Fur-
thermore, even where a transferor retains "administrative" or man-
agerial powers over the transferred property as trustee thereof, or
otherwise is considered to hold such powers subject to a fiduciary obli-
gation, it is clear that he is free to exercise these powers for his own
benefit, subject only to the requirement that such exercise is in good
227. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 146, § 185, at 1478-79.
228. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949, 953-54 (6th Cir. 1971) (Phillips,C.J., dissenting), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971).
229. Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970, 981 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 590(1st Cir. 1964). See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text; notes 235-61 infraand accompanying text. Cf. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970),
acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
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faith,28 ° if his retention of these powers creates a conflict between his
individual interests and his fiduciary interests. 23 ' Moreover, where
as here the only limitation upon the exercise of a fiduciary power is
that it must be in good faith, such exercise is not controlled by deter-
minable external standards, enforceable by a court having equity juris-
diction, within the meaning of Jennings v. Smith.23 2 Consequently,
if a transferor of stock retains a beneficial interest in the corporation,
whether in voting or nonvoting stock, his reserved fiduciary powers to
vote the transferred stock or to control its disposition should be deemed
discretionary in his hands, within the meaning of Jennings v. Smith,
at least where the transferred stock is voting stock and he has voting
control of the corporation after the transfer, since his retention of
fiduciary powers creates a conflict between his individual and fiduciary
interests.2 33  Similarly, where a transferor transfers his entire interest
in stock, his retained fiduciary powers to vote the transferred stock and
to control its disposition should be considered discretionary in his
hands, within the meaning of Jennings v. Smith, at least if they invest
him with voting control of the corporation. For in this situation, the
transferor's reservation of fiduciary powers engenders a conflict be-
tween his individual interest in retaining his position as a director or
officer of the corporation and his fiduciary interest. Furthermore, if
the transferred stock is nonvoting stock, the transferor's expressly re-
tained fiduciary power to control the disposition of the transferred
stock, combined with his implied retention of corporate voting control,
should be deemed a discretionary power to accumulate or distribute the
income from the transferred stock, within the meaning of Jennings
v. Smith.2 34
Every power whose exercise can be compelled, prevented, or re-
viewed by a court of equity apparently is considered to be limited by
ascertainable external standards for estate tax purposes, unless it en-
ables its holder to affect the relative rights of the income beneficiary
and the remainderman.2 3 If it does so empower its holder, it is non-
230. See O'Hayer v. de St. Aubin, 30 App. Div. 2d 419, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2d
Dep't 1968) ; In re Pincus' Estate, 378 Pa. 102, 105 A.2d 82 (1954) ; In re Steele's
Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954) ; Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411
(1950).
231. See Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,688(6th Cir. 1970), aff'g 50 T.C. 915 (1968); O'Hayer v. de St. Aubin, 30 App. Div.2d
419, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2d Dep't 1968) ; In re Pincus' Estate, 378 Pa. 102, 105 A.2d82 (1954) ; In re Steele's Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954) ; Flagg's Estate,
365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950); G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGaRT, supra note 222,§ 543 (U) ; 2 A. Sco'rr, supra note 146, §§ 170.9, 170.24.
232. Discussed supra pp. 214-16.
233. See Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,688(6th Cir. 1970), aff'g 50 T.C. 915 (1968) ; cases cited note 230 supra.
234. See notes 235-261 infra and accompanying text.
235. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
See United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Estate of Ralph Budd,
49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967). Compare
Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 Cum. BULL.
5, with Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2
Cum. BULL. 3. N.B. A power exercisable by its holder for his own benefit per se
enables him to affect the relative rights of the income beneficiary and the
remainderman.
229
230 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXXI
discretionary for estate tax purposes only if expressly limited by a
determinable external standard.23 6 Thus, considered individually, a
transferor's fiduciary powers to vote the transferred stock23 7 and to
control its disposition 218 properly are held to be nondiscretionary, even
absent an express imposition on their exercise of an ascertainable ex-
ternal standard, where the transferor does not have voting control of
the corporation after the transfer. If, however, the transferor possesses
corporate voting control after the transfer, his expressly retained
powers to vote the transferred stock and to control its disposition,
when considered in conjunction with each other and with the fact of
retained voting control, amount to an impliedly reserved power to ac-
cumulate or distribute the income from the transferred stock. 239 Since
a power to accumulate or distribute the income from transferred
property enables its holder to affect the relative rights of the income
beneficiary and the remainderman,2 4 ° it is nondiscretionary only if
expressly limited by an ascertainable external standard.24 ' If it is not so
limited, its retention by the transferor renders the transfer subject to
both sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 of the Code.2" This conclusion,
moreover, is not affected by the fact that the power to accumulate or
distribute income impliedly arises from the express or implied reserva-
236. Cases cited note 235 supra.
237. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp.
892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ; Estate
of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,813(2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1971); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), non-
acquiesced in, 1963-1 Cm. BULL. 5. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,
423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970); Estate of Aline Peters Peters, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. 994(1964). With the exception of Byrum, none of the above cases involved a situation
in which the transferor, after the transfer, had voting control of the corporation(s)
whose stock he transferred. The Byrum theory, that the fiduciary relationship between
corporate directors and shareholders, causes the exercise of corporate voting control
to be limited by an ascertainable external standard, is discussed in notes 136-68
supra and accompanying text. But cf. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242(1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. REV. BULL No. 9, at 6.
238. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892(S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) ; United
States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59
F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) ; Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969),
aff'd per curiam, 71-2 U.S. Tax Gas. ff 12,813 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1971) ; Estate of Ralph
Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of James H. Graham, 46 T.C. 415 (1966);
Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1 CUM. BULL.
5; Estate of George W. Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946), acquiesced in, 1946-2 Cum. BULL.
3; Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943), petition for review dismissed
nolle pros. (2d Cir. June 1, 1944), nonacquiesced in, 1944 Cum. BULL. 37; Estate
of Laura B. Alexander, 2 Tax Ct. Mem. 1156 (1943). See Old Colony Trust Co.
v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970) ; Estate of Aline Peters Peters, 23
Tax Ct. Mem. 944 (1964) ; textual matter in note 237 supra.
239. See notes 83-87, 137-87 supra and accompanying text; text following note
212 supra. See Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1971) (Phillips,
C.J., dissenting); Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970, 981 (1963), aff'd, 332
F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
240. Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 590 (1st
Cir. 1964) ; Estate of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946), aff'd on this point and
rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
142 (1st Cir. 1947). See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966);
Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g and remanding 272 F. Supp.
544 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
241. Cases cited note 235 supra.
242. See note 17 supra.
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tion of other powers, rather than from its express retention as such.243
Nor is this conclusion affected by the fact that the powers which must
be aggregated to imply the retention of a power to accumulate or
distribute, if considered individually, are or may be nondiscretionary.
The principle that an aggregation of nondiscretionary powers can
be deemed a discretionary power first was articulated -in State St.
Trust Co. v. United States.144 The transferor in State Street retained
as trustee exceedingly broad "administrative" and managerial powers
over the transferred property. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the retained powers, considered in the aggregate,
required the application of a predecessor of section 2036(a) (2) of theCode to the transfer, even though such retained powers probably would
not require the application of this section if they were considered
individually. On this issue the court stated:
Perhaps no single power conferred by the decedent on the
trustees would be enough to warrant inclusion of the corpora of
the trusts in his estate. But we believe that the powers conferred
on the trustees, considered as a whole, are so broad and all in-
clusive that within any limits a Massachusetts court of equity
could rationally impose, the trustees, within the scope of their dis-
cretionary powers, could very substantially shift the economic bene-fits of the trusts between the life tenants and the remaindermen. 2"
For many years the judicial attitude toward the State Street prin-
ciple was one which can best be described as passive resistance. Until
recently, the courts, though not denying the validity of the principle,
consistently have distinguished State Street on its facts. 246 Recently,
however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Old Colony
Trust Co. v. United States,2 7 purported to overrule State Street. InOld Colony Trust Co., the transferor, like the transferor in State Street,
reserved as trustee exceedingly broad "administrative" and managerial
powers over the transferred property. In holding that the transferor's
retention of these powers did not require the application of either
section 2 036 (a) (2) or section 2038 of the Code to the transfer, the
court stated:
If State Street Trust Co. v. United States . . .was correctly
decided in this aspect, the government must prevail because of the
Article 7 powers....
243. Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970, 981 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 590(Ist Cir. 1964). See Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Nov. 9,
1971).
244. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
245. Id. at 639.246. E.g., Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd per curiarn,71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,813 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1971); Estate of Ralph Budd,49 T.C. 468 (1968). See Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971),
aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S.Nov. 9, 1971); Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacquiesced in, 1963-1
Cum. BuLL. 5.
247. 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
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The government's position, to be sound, must be that the
trustee's powers are beyond the court's control. Under Massa-
chusetts law, however, no amount of administrative discretion
prevents judicial supervision of the trustee....
We do not believe that trustee powers are to be more
broadly construed for tax purposes than the probate court would
construe them for administrative purposes. . . . We hold that no
aggregation of purely administrative powers can meet the govern-
ment's amorphous test of "sufficient dominion and control" so as to
be equated with ownership.2 48
Although, on the basis of the above language, Old Colony Trust Co.
arguably could be said to stand for the proposition that, if retained
"administrative" and managerial powers are nondiscretionary when
considered individually, they remain nondiscretionary when considered
in the aggregate, it does not in fact do so. When taken in context, the
above language in fact holds only that State Street was wrong in its
conclusion that Massachusetts law permits the retained powers to be
exercised in such a way as to "substantially shift the economic benefits
of the trusts between the life tenants and the remaindermen." '49 Like-
wise, to the extent that Old Colony Trust Co. holds that "[t]he
government's position [that a transferor's retention of an aggregation
of administrative powers requires application of sections 2036(a)(2)
and 2038], to be sound, must be that the trustee's powers are beyond
the court's control,"25 it clearly is erroneous. 251 If, on the other hand,
State Street was buried by Old Colony Trust Co., it recently was
resurrected by Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner,25 2 and now is en-
joying a vigorous renaissance. 253
The decedent in Stewart created two trusts, naming a bank as
sole trustee. She retained for life the income from both trusts. The
ultimate remaindermen of each trust were named charities which met
the donee requirements of the estate tax charitable deduction.254 The
trust agreements gave broad administrative powers to the trustee. The
248. Id. at 602-03.
249. 263 F.2d at 639. See Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 1281
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
250. 423 F.2d at 603.
251. See notes 144-55 supra and accompanying text.
252. 436 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1971).
253. See Rand v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,797 (2d Cir. July 22,
1971); Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,786 (3d Cir.
June 9, 1971); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,777
(5th Cir. May 7,,1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971) ; Miami
Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,774 (5th Cir.
Apr. 30, 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971) ; Estate of
Toulmin v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,775 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 1971),
appeal docketed by Gov't, 6th Cir. 1971.
254. Set forth in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2055.
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corpora of these trusts was, of course, included in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2036(a) (1) of the Code. At issue, however, was
an estate tax charitable deduction claimed under section 2055 for
the value of the remainders in these trusts. The Commissioner denied
the charitable deduction on the ground that the trustee's broad adminis-
trative powers over the trusts precluded the value of the charitable
remainders therein from being presently ascertainable. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying specifically on State Street,
upheld the Commissioner because, under applicable state law, the
trustee's exercise of its administrative powers was not "limited by an
ascertainable standard."25 In discussing this issue, the court stated:
[T]he Government argues that the trustee for the Stewart trusts
may well act with the purest motives and always in good faith,
but state law will not provide any fixed and ascertainable standard
of investment and management conduct for the trustee. Here the
decedent's dispositive intent does not reveal any desire to favor the
life tenants over the remaindermen, but decedent's administrative
intent was to rely solely upon the trustee's judgment and discre-
tion rather than upon the normal rules of state law governing
the administration of trusts. Such broad powers have been previ-
ously recognized as enabling a trustee, acting safely within his
prerogatives, to shift "very substantially * * * the economic
benefits of the trusts between the life tenants and the remainder-
men." State Street Trust Co. v. United States .... 256
Although Stewart involves the allowability of the estate tax
charitable deduction, rather than the applicability of section 2036(a) (2)
or section 2038 of the Code, it clearly reaffirms and reestablishes the
State Street principle that an aggregation of nondiscretionary "adminis-
trative" or managerial powers can be deemed a discretionary power if,
under applicable state law, the holder of the powers can by their com-
bined exercise shift the economic benefits of the trust among its bene-
ficiaries without breaching his fiduciary duty.25 7 Moreover, in view
of some of the cases decided after Stewart,25 this principle did not
255. 436 F.2d at 1285.
256. Id. at 1288.
257. E.g., Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,786(3d Cir. June 9, 1971), in which the Third Circuit, on a set of facts substantially
similar to that involved in Stewart, reaffirmed its holding therein, but allowed
the estate tax charitable deduction on the theory that, under applicable state law, i.e.,
that of New Jersey, the trustee's exercise of the administrative powers in question,
considered in the aggregate, was limited by a fixed and ascertainable standard.
258. Rand v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,797 (2d Cir. July 22,197i); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,777 (5th Cir.May 7, 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971); Miami Beac&First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,774 (5th Cir. Apr. 3t,
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971); Estate of Toulmin v.United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,775 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 1971), appeal docketedby Gov't, 6th Cir. 1971. Although Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 71-1 U.S. TaxCas. 12,786 (3d Cir. June 9, 1971), applied this principle, it did so on the basis ofEstate of Stewart v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971).
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originate in State Street, although it was first articulated therein.
Rather, it seems to be inherent in estate tax jurisprudence. The
Second"5 9 and Fifth Circuits,26 for example, recently applied this prin-
ciple to disallow the charitable deduction without reference to State
Street, Stewart, or each other. In fact, it is implicit in their decisions
that these circuits regard this principle as too well established to re-
quire discussion.26 ' It follows that the fact that the powers which must
be aggregated to raise the implication of retention by a transferor of
the power to accumulate or distribute are, or may be, nondiscretionary
if considered individually will not prevent such implication.
V. CONCLUSION
An inter vivos transfer of closely-held corporate stock under which
the transferor retains voting control of the corporation whose stock is
transferred, clearly affords the transferor rights in or over the trans-
ferred stock. While such rights can be considerable, not all such trans-
fers are necessarily testamentary dispositions within the meaning of
sections 2036-38 of the Code. For example, since such a transfer,
absent other factors, does not involve the retention of an income262 or
reversionary2 68 interest, a retention of voting control without more
does not bring a transfer within the scope of either section 2036(a) (1)
or section 2037, respectively. However, as corporate voting control
does enable its holder ultimately to control the amount of dividends paid
on the transferred stock,264 such resultant power is in effect a power to
accumulate or distribute income,2 65 which, if discretionary, is both a
section 2036(a) (2) right to designate26 and a section 2038 right to
alter or amend.2 6 7 Therefore, such a transfer should, under certain
circumstances at least, be characterized as a testamentary disposition
within the scope of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038.68
In the case of an outright transfer of stock under which corporate
voting control is -impliedly retained, such retention, of itself, should
cause the application of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 to the trans-
fer. 2 9  Where, however, the transfer is in trust, neither of these
sections should apply unless the transferred stock is unmarketable or
its disposition is subject to control by the transferor. 7 ° This distinc-
259. Rand v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,797 (2d Cir. July 22,
1971).
260. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,777 (5th Cir.
May 7, 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971) ; Miami Beach First
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,774 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 1971),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971).
261. See cases cited notes 259 & 260 supra.
262. See cases cited notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text; cases cited notes
189-211 supra and accompanying text.
263. See cases cited notes 57-73 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
265. Cases cited notes 84 & 85 supra and accompanying text.
266. Cases cited note 86 supra.
267. Cases cited note 87 supra.
268. See note 88 supra and text accompanying notes 88 & 89 supra.
269. See notes 176-87 supra and accompanying text.
270. Id.
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tion with respect to the mode of transfer is necessitated by the theory
that property transferred in trust, for purposes of the transfer sections
of the Code, is the trust corpus itself rather than the specific assets
comprising it.
The question of whether a transferor's retained power over the
transferred stock is nevertheless a nondiscretionary power, and there-
fore not within the scope of either section 2036(a) (2) or section 2038,
may arise in two situations. It may arise, as it did in Byrum, with
respect to the transferor's power to control corporate dividend policies,
or it may arise with respect to the transferor's express retention of
so-called administrative powers over the transferred stock itself, such
as the right to vote it or to control its disposition. Contrary to the
holding in Byrum, the fiduciary duty of a corporate board of directors
in determining dividend policies is not controlled by a determinable
external standard so as to render the controlling shareholder's power
over the transferred stock nondiscretionary 2 71 Similarly, although
"administrative powers" over the transferred stock itself generally
have been held to be nondiscretionary, if the transferor retains voting
control of the corporation in addition to the power to control the dis-
position of the transferred stock this combination of powers in the
hands of the transferor should render discretionary that which other-
wise might be considered nondiscretionary 7 2
The established meaning of the words of sections 2036(a) (2)
and 2038 thus requires the conclusion that a retention of corporate
voting control affords a transferor a power over the transferred stock
which is both a "right... to designate" and a "right to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate." Those decisions arguably to the contrary lack
authoritative value with respect to this issue or are incorrect. The
Supreme Court has agreed to review Byrum. Hopefully, the court's
forthcoming decision will provide a much needed opinion of authorita-
tive value which will clarify the estate tax consequences of an inter vivos
transfer of corporate stock.
271. See notes 137-68 supra and accompanying text.
272. See notes 212-61 supra and accompanying text.
